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ABSTRACT
This dissertation proposes several improvements to existing adversarial attacks against
MalConv, a raw-byte malware classifier for Windows PE files. The included contributions
greatly improve the success rates and performance of gradient-based file overlay attacks. All
improvements are included in a new open-source attack utility called BitCamo.
Several new payload initialization strategies for use with gradient-based attacks are
proposed and evaluated as potential replacements for the randomized initialization method
used by current attacks. An algorithm for determining the optimal payload size is also
proposed. The resulting improvements achieve a 100% evasion rate against eligible target
executables using an average payload size of only 300 bytes. The results are substantially
better than those reported by other open-source tools or attacks proposed within the research
literature.
Existing gradient attacks against MalConv contain a long-running byte reconstruction
phase necessary to map backwards across a non-differentiable embedding layer used by the
model. Three proposals are presented to significantly improve the runtime of this phase,
including the addition of parallelism, limiting the scope of reconstruction to the payload only,
and introducing a K-D tree data structure to allow for blazing fast spatial searches in
comparison to the L2 distance metric used by current attacks.
A pre-detection mechanism proposed in previous research checks if executables have
the same code section hash but a different overall hash with respect to known malicious files,
allowing adversarial examples to be immediately rejected by a detection pipeline before
MalConv evaluates the sample. This dissertation proposes a single-byte code section attack
that can completely bypass this defense mechanism in over 63% of samples. The predetection attack can be used in conjunction with the other new improvements to offer a
formidable attack capability against MalConv and other detection models sharing a similar
architecture.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Introduction to the Problem
Artificial intelligence (AI) has become a topic of immense popularity and importance
over the past decade, producing intense media hype and capturing the attention and
imagination of the public. A branch of AI known as machine learning (ML) excels in its
ability to recognize patterns, make predictions, and perform tasks without being explicitly
programmed. Machine learning is frequently applied to problems in the cybersecurity domain,
often to detect anomalous activities (Xu, Qian, & Hu, 2017, 2019a, 2019b, 2019c, 2020).
Over the course the past decade, the explosion of big data and advances in graphical
processing units (GPUs) have allowed an ML technique known as deep learning (DL) to
thrive (Chollet, 2018). Deep learning was originally inspired by the human brain and uses
artificial neural networks (ANN) to learn higher-level features from large quantities of raw
input.
The use of deep neural networks (DNNs) has made it possible to perform tasks such as
image classification, object detection, speech recognition, natural language processing, and
even malware detection, the latter of which will become the central theme in this dissertation.
Neural networks are not without their share of security concerns though. Szegedy et al. (2013)
first demonstrated that neural networks are vulnerable to an attack known as adversarial
examples, where attackers can make small modifications to the input of a neural network with
the goal of causing the network to make an incorrect prediction or classification.
To best explain adversarial examples, the next section will begin by introducing the
concept in the context of image classification, both to provide historical context and allow for
ease of explanation. The chapter will then transition to discuss the application of adversarial
examples within the malware domain. This sets the stage for the goal of this dissertation,
where attacks will be developed against a popular neural network called MalConv, which uses
the raw bytes of a Windows Portable Executable (PE) file to determine maliciousness (Raff et
al., 2018a). Success rates of existing attacks against MalConv appear to be wildly inconsistent
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throughout the research literature, with many attacks entailing a high computational cost. This
design science dissertation seeks to determine if improvements to accuracy or performance
are possible, and to include them in an open-source attack tool. Specific proposals for
improvements are presented at the end of this chapter after a more through introduction to the
topic and explanation of current issues.

An Introduction to Adversarial Examples Using Images
First observed by Szegedy et al. (2013), an adversarial example is an input to a
machine learning model in which an attacker has made subtle modifications with the goal of
causing a misclassification to occur. Figure 1 shows an example in which an image of a beach
can be selectively modified so that the target machine learning model now classifies it as a
mountain range with high confidence, while still appearing as a beach to human observers.

Figure 1. Example of an adversarial example, inspired by Szegedy et al. (2013).

When creating adversarial examples for use with image classifiers, any pixel within
the input image can be freely modified by the attacker. The only constraint is that their final
values must remain within the valid range allowed by the associated image format, for
example, 0-255 for RGB images. No restrictions exist on which pixels are allowed to be
modified, or how many are allowed to be modified, but its desirable for the change to go
unnoticed by human observers. Figure 2 illustrates that an image is merely a collection of
pixels in which any pixel can be freely modified to produce another valid image.
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Figure 2. Modifying a single pixel within in a picture of a beach.

For an adversarial attack to succeed, the attacker must also figure out which pixels
should be changed and what values those pixels should contain to fool the machine learning
model into producing a misclassification. In a white-box attack scenario, attackers have full
access to all information regarding a trained classification model, to include the model’s
parameters and weights (Yuan, He, Zhu, & Li, 2019). In these scenarios, adversarial examples
can be created by first computing a gradient (Yuan, et al., 2019). A gradient is a vector of
partial derivatives that point in the direction of steepest ascent with respect to an input
function. Adversarial examples use gradients to either maximize a loss function with respect
to the actual classification or minimize a loss function with respect to a target classification.
Loss is a measurement for how well a model is performing in terms of how far off the
model’s predictions are from the true labels of the input data. A more thorough explanation of
loss, gradients, and the mathematical underpinnings of machine learning will be provided in
chapter 2.
The earliest formalization of gradient-based attacks is the Fast Gradient Sign Method
(FGSM), originally proposed by Goodfellow, Shlens, & Szegedy (2014). The attack works by
calculating the gradient with respect to the input, and then slightly nudging the input in the
direction of the gradients as to maximize the overall loss (Goodfellow et al., 2014). When
used to train a model, gradients are instead used to update the weights of a network instead of
the inputs. When FGSM is used, however, the weights remain fixed and are never changed. A
more thorough explanation of FGSM is provided in chapter 2.
In black-box scenarios, an attacker has no access to the internals of a target machine
learning model but is generally allowed to inspect the final output (Yuan, et al., 2019).
Although computation of gradients is not possible in black-box scenarios, a common
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technique is to perform a gradient-based attack on a white-box model trained with similar data
and then attempt to transfer the resulting adversarial example back to the black-box model
(Yuan, et al., 2019). These models are referred to as substitute or surrogate models and can
often be trained by repeatedly querying the black-box model to produce a series of inputoutput pairs (Chakraborty, Alam, Dey, Chattopadhyay, & Mukhopadhyay, 2018). The
transferability of adversarial examples makes white-box attacks relevant in scenarios where
no information about the target machine learning model is known. The construction of
substitute models is a form of extraction attack, but is often computationally expensive to
complete.

Adversarial Examples for Malware Classifiers
The previous section provided a gentle introduction to adversarial examples by using
image classifiers as an example. Adversarial examples are in no way limited to the image
domain, however, and can be applied to a wide variety of applications. This dissertation will
focus exclusively on adversarial examples for malware classifiers using Windows PE files.
Producing adversarial malware is a significantly more challenging problem than
producing adversarial images. Recall that any pixel within an image can be freely modified to
take on a wide range of possible values. The same cannot be said about executable file
formats, as altering bytes has the potential to change the program’s functionality or its ability
to run altogether. This is because the content of a Windows PE file includes important
headers, pointers to other parts of the file, and even the compiled code used by the program
when it runs. A more thorough review of the Windows PE file format will be discussed in
chapter 2.
Research into adversarial attacks against malware classifiers was historically very
theoretical in nature, producing representative feature vectors instead of fully runnable
programs (Park & Yener, 2020). This reiterates the tremendous difficulty of producing
working attacks within this area of research.
As previously mentioned, not all parts of a Windows PE file can be freely modified
without fear of breaking the program’s functionality. Most gradient-based adversarial attacks
therefore tend to overcome these challenges by locating positions within the file where a
large, contiguous series of bytes can be placed without disrupting functionality. Prime
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examples include appending data to the very end of the file, utilizing unused space at the end
of a section, or even adding a new section. Other unused space exists but is often more
restrictive in terms of the payload size capable of being placed at those locations. Demetrio et
al. (2021b) propose several methods oriented towards manipulating Windows PE headers. A
thorough review of the usable space within Windows PE files can be found in chapter 2, along
with relevant binary patching techniques.

Introduction to MalConv
Traditionally, most machine learning models for malware detection were trained using
a feature engineering approach, where various properties and characteristics about the
malware would be gathered and used as input to the model (Park & Yener, 2020). This
includes static features such as op code frequencies or dynamic features such as frequency of
system calls (Park & Yener, 2020).
This dissertation will focus exclusively on attacking a model that uses a fundamentally
different technique. MalConv is a neural network using a file’s raw bytes as input, effectively
eliminating the need for a feature selection process and the domain expertise it tends to
require (Raff et al., 2018a). Other key advantages to this model include its strong ability to
generalize and to detect malicious features regardless of their specific location within the file
(Raff et al., 2018a). A thorough analysis of the MalConv architecture is provided in chapter 2.
This dissertation opts to use a pre-trained version of MalConv, trained on the EMBER
dataset containing 1.1 million binary files (Anderson & Roth, 2018). This model differs
slightly from the one proposed on the original MalConv specifications, with the most
important change being the use of 1 MB inputs instead of 2 MB to overcome memory
limitations on GPUs (Anderson & Roth, 2018). The decision to use the EMBER-trained
MalConv model was made for the following reasons:
•

The effort required to collect and maintain a representative dataset this large is a
large project in and of itself.

•

It was one of the only pre-trained, open-source MalConv models publicly available
on the internet.
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•

The authors had significantly more compute power available to them. Anderson &
Roth (2018) note that the model took 10 days to train using dual Titan X (Pascal)
GPUs.

•

Many other researchers opt to use this pre-trained model as well (Demetrio,
Biggio, Lagorio. Roli, & Armando, 2019).

Effect of Packing on MalConv
Due to this dissertation’s focus on offensive-oriented techniques, no attention will be
given to defensive improvements to the model itself at this time. Packing and obfuscation are
other well-known techniques that can be used to evade malware classifiers, to include
MalConv. Packers are a type of software that can be used to re-write a target program by
compressing it within another program. Packers are sometimes used by benign software to
protect intellectual property or reduce file size (Demetrio et al., 2019). As it pertains to
machine learning-based malware classifiers, packers have the effect of hiding malicious
features.
Demetrio et al. (2019) explain that packing is a much more invasive procedure than
adversarial attacks, and do not clearly demonstrate the vulnerability of machine learning
models to extremely small changes. Many security tools also employ automated unpacking
routines, which has been an extremely active area of research for well over a decade (Coogan,
Debray, Kaochar, & Townsend, 2009). Adversarial attacks are therefore being researched as
an alternative approach to packing. In some cases, the two techniques may even complement
each other. For example, a detection pipeline may opt to unpack a sample and send the
resulting unpacked executable into a machine learning model. If the attacker applies
adversarial perturbations before packing their program, it may be possible to evade detection.
From an offensive perspective, the adversarial attacks used in this dissertation can be
applied to packed samples in much the same way as non-packed samples. As will later be
demonstrated, a packed malware sample receiving a positive result from MalConv can still be
perturbed until it achieves evasion, all without disrupting functionality. The attack tool
developed in this dissertation will be tested using samples drawn uniformly at random from a
large dataset containing over 10 million malicious binaries, including both packed and
unpacked binaries (Harang & Rudd, 2020).
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Adversarial Attacks Against MalConv
Kolosnjaji et al. (2018) and Kreuk et al. (2018) produced amongst the earliest attacks
against MalConv. Each uses a gradient-based attack in which the payload is appended to the
very end of the file, and each point to MalConv’s non-differentiable embedding layer as being
a central issue they must overcome. The embedding layer acts as a lookup table, where each
byte is mapped to an 8-dimentional array (Raff et al., 2018a). This presents problems for
gradient-based attacks, being that the embedding layer is non-differentiable.
Kreuk et al. (2018) solves this problem by running the input bytes through the
embedding layer only, producing an embedded representation of the input bytes. The authors
then run the previously described FGSM attack on the remainder of the model with respect to
the embedded bytes only. After the embedded bytes have been modified, the authors then
attempt to map backwards through the embedding layer, locating the closest possible byte for
each of the corresponding embedded representations. This process is also referred to as the
reconstruction phase and is somewhat computationally expensive in comparison to the rest of
the attack. A visualization of this attack can be seen in Figure 3.

Figure 3. Visualization of the adversarial attack proposed by Kreuk et al. (2018).

Due to the inability to modify many parts of a PE file, Kreuk et al. (2018) initialized a
fixed-length payload at the very end of the original file. The authors opted to initialize this
payload using bytes selected uniformly at random. Research to determine if this phase of the
attack can be improved will become a central focus for this dissertation. A more in-depth
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examination of existing attacks, to include the gradient-based attacks Kreuk et al. (2018) and
Kolosnjaji et al. (2018), can be found in chapter 2.

Predetection Pipelines
Although the raw byte inputs used by MalConv eliminate the need for domain
knowledge, it appears likely that future research will attempt to reincorporate it back into the
process to some degree. Demetrio et al. (2021b) suggest that future research directions should
explore the addition of domain knowledge into the learning process to bridge the gap between
classifiers that are completely feature-driven and classifiers that use a raw-byte approach.
Park & Yener (2020) suggest that future research directions should include detection pipelines
instead of just using a single machine learning model.
Chen et al. (2019) proposed a pre-detection mechanism capable of rejecting 100% of
adversarial examples in their initial experiment. The pre-detection mechanism works by
computing a hash of both the entire PE file and of the code section specifically, comparing the
hashes to those contained within a malware database. If the code section hash of a new sample
matches the code section hash of a known malicious file but their overall file hashes differ,
the authors conclude some other part of the file has been tampered with. The sample is then
immediately rejected as being an adversarial example. A detailed description of their proposal
can be found in chapter 2.

Statement of the problem
It remains unclear if the success rates from the gradient-based append attacks
proposed by Kolosnjaji et al. (2018) and Kreuk et al. (2018) can be reliably reproduced, as
other researchers appear to report lower success rates when using these techniques on models
trained with other datasets (Suciu, Coull, & Johns, 2019; Chen et al., 2019). Further
examination is needed to determine if the inability to reproduce the initial results is entirely
due to dataset discrepancies, or if implementation issues existed as well.
Chen et al. (2019) believes the initialization of gradient-based payloads using random
bytes is likely a very poor choice. However, few payload initialization strategies are proposed
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within the research literature. Initializing the payload with a new and improved strategy could
have a noticeable impact on overall success rates of adversarial attacks.
The byte reconstruction phase of the attack proposed by Kreuk et al. (2018) appears to
be computationally expensive. An improvement to this phase of the attack would allow for
significantly more samples to be tested during experiments, thereby improving the quality of
future research.
Chen et al. (2019) proposed a pre-detection mechanism that has an obvious avenue for
attackers to target. Any change to the code section would theoretically allow an attacker to
completely bypass the pre-detection mechanism. An attacker merely needs to change a single
byte to produce different code section hash. Confirmation that this defensive resource can be
easily defeated is the final problem this dissertation will attempt to answer.

Research Questions
This following research questions will be answered:
1. Can the append-based FGSM attack be re-implemented and improved to achieve
consistently high evasion rates?
2. Can the append-based FGSM attack benefit from a new byte initialization strategy?
3. Can performance of the long-running reconstruction phase of the append-based FGSM
attack be improved?
4. Can the recently proposed pre-detection mechanism be completely bypassed?

Significance of the research
Adversarial attacks may give the impression of being theoretical in nature, with many
successful attacks occurring within controlled test environments. Real-world occurrences
have already been observed though. A research team from Skylight Cyber reverse engineered
Cylance’s endpoint protection product and discovered a vulnerability allowing 90% of
malware to evade detection (Ashkenazy & Zini, 2019). Cylance is a company well known for
their heavy use of AI and ML to detect malware. The researchers tricked the Cylance
detection model by appending benign strings from the video game Rocket League, effectively
creating a universal bypass (Ashkenazy & Zini, 2019).
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Large software companies are also beginning to recognize adversarial machine
learning attacks as being a serious problem. A search of recent job postings reveals several
large software companies such as Microsoft and NVIDIA are hiring researchers and AI red
team operators to begin evaluating their products for susceptibility to these attacks.
This dissertation is an offensive-oriented project with the goal of improving attacks
against malware classifiers, and to completely bypass a recently proposed pre-detection
mechanism. Due to the limited number of tools capable of producing adversarial attacks using
Windows PE files, the improvements offered within this dissertation will be made public in
the form of a command-line program called BitCamo. To further contribute towards efforts of
the security research community, the tool will also feature a bulk-processing feature to allow
for experiments to be conducted using large datasets.
Research into adversarial malware is important because it provides a fundamentally
different way for malware to hide in plain sight, whereas other techniques such as packing are
much more invasive, with many security products already attempting to account for them. As
demonstrated in the attack against Cylance, adversarial attacks have the potential to be a much
more powerful capability as compared to packing, sometimes allowing a universal bypass to
occur.
While the development of offensive techniques may seem counter intuitive as an end
goal, security is a very much a cat-and-mouse game. A new offensive capability will always
be met with a new defensive capability. As such, both offensive- and defensive-oriented
research will further the field as whole. By demonstrating the ease at which adversarial
malware can be created, it raises awareness to the problem in hopes that security vendors will
begin to incorporate additional safeguards in their machine learning-based applications and
take adversarial machine learning attacks more seriously.
The release of this dissertation and its associated source code is not expected to cause
undue harm to security vendors using machine learning technology within their products. The
release of open-source attack software is generally viewed in a positive light by the security
industry, as responsible use of these products helps to harden existing defenses and allow
companies to simulate real-world attacks (Harang, 2020). For example, the use of tools such
as Metasploit and Cobalt Strike has proved to invaluable for use in penetration testing and
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offensive security engagements, despite the potential for attackers to use these products as
well.

Organization of this paper
In the next chapter, a full literature review is provided, greatly expanding upon each of
topics introduced in this chapter. Chapter 3 outlines a plan for how the research will be
conducted, to include a description of the research methodology and details for how the
proposed attack will be implemented and later validated. Chapter 4 then presents the results of
the research and demonstrates the success of the new attack methods. Finally, Chapter 5
provides a summary of the paper, lessons learned, limitations, and potential research
directions for future work.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
Introduction
This chapter reviews existing literature from a wide variety of topics pertaining to this
dissertation. Topics include the Windows PE file format, machine learning, deep learning,
adversarial examples, malware detection, MalConv, existing adversarial attacks against
MalConv, and defenses against adversarial attacks. Given the tremendous amount of
background knowledge required to embark upon this research project, the goal of this chapter
is not to provide a comprehensive review of every single one of these subjects, but rather to
provide the minimal amount of prerequisite knowledge necessary to understand the remaining
chapters of the dissertation.

Windows Portable Executable (PE) Format
This section reviews prior research pertaining to the Windows PE file format. The
goal is not to provide a comprehensive review of the format, but rather to provide a brief
overview of its structure, convey the difficulty of modifying bytes without breaking
functionality, and to identify methods for embedding adversarial bytes within the file.
Positions suitable for placement of the attack generally coincide with decades-old research
involving data hiding techniques within Windows PE files. Early research in data hiding
techniques predates adversarial examples and therefore tends to focus on hiding entire files or
additional code within PE files. A later section of this chapter will review literature involving
existing adversarial attacks on raw byte malware classifiers, where it will become apparent
that data hiding concepts have been extended to work with adversarial examples.
To begin the discussion of Windows PE files, its necessary to understand what an
executable file format is used for. A binary executable is a compiled program containing
machine code that a computer can execute (Andriesse, 2018). There are many types of
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executable file formats, but Linux systems will generally use the Executable and Linkable
Format (ELF), whereas Windows systems use the Portable Executable (PE) format
(Andriesse, 2018). This dissertation will focus exclusively on the Windows PE file format,
following the same direction as other research projects that attack raw byte malware
classifiers. This is a natural progression given that existing defensive-based work has
primarily elected to use Windows PE files to train their classification models. This is of no
surprise given that most malware is still designed to target users of Windows operating
systems. In Q1 2020, an astonishing 83.45% of malware was reported to be targeting
Windows devices (AV-TEST, 2020).
Andriesse (2018) explained that the PE format is based off Unix’s Common Object
File Format (COFF) and is therefore referred to in some literature as PE/COFF. He continues
by describing the historical reasoning for the presence of an MS-DOS header at the beginning
of all PE files, which always begin with the ASCII characters “MZ” and are sometimes
referred to as “magic bytes”. To assist in the transition from the MS-DOS format to the newer
PE format, he notes that all PE files begin with an MS-DOS header and contain a pointer to
the beginning of the newer PE header. This allows older loaders to execute PE files, after
which they print out “This program cannot be run in DOS mode”, a string contained within
the MS-DOS stub. Newer loaders will instead opt to resolve the pointer to the PE header,
contained within a field called e_lfanew, allowing the real PE program to begin executing.
The MS-DOS header, MS-DOS-stub, and PE header can be seen in Figure 4, along with the
rest of the PE file structure. Because the leading “MZ” string and e_lfanew field are the only
parts of the MS-DOS header used by newer loaders, a later section of the literature review
will demonstrate attacks that attempt to utilize all remaining space within the MS-DOS header
to embed adversarial bytes (Demetrio et al., 2021b).
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Figure 4. Structure of a Windows PE file, adapted from Andriesse (2018).

Andriesse (2018) describes three major entities within the PE header: the PE signature,
the PE file header, and the PE optional header. The PE signature is merely another series of
magic bytes, namely “PE\0\0”. The PE file header contains important fields such as Machine,
identifying the target architecture, and others such as NumberOfSections and
SizeOfOptionalHeader

to assist in parsing the remainder of the file. The last entity

Andriesse describes is the PE optional header, which is not actually optional in the case of
executables. The PE optional header includes several important pointers and relative virtual
addresses (RVAs), such as ImageBase, BaseOfCode, and AddressOfEntryPoint. Finally,
Andriesse notes that the export directory and import directory can also be found through
RVAs located here.
The last major components to the PE files format are the sections and section headers.
Andriesse (2018) states that the headers contain important information such as the
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SizeOfRawData, PointerToRawData, VirtualSize, VirtualAddress,
Characteristics.

and

He concludes with a discussion of noteworthy sections and their purpose.

The .text section contains assembled code, .rdata contains read-only data, .data contains
data that is both readable and writable, .bss contains zero-initialized data, .edata contains
exported functions, and .idata contains imported functions.
The literature review of PE files has thus far focused almost exclusively on reviewing
well-documented aspects of the file format. Although not mentioned in many texts, PE files
can also include an overlay, which is best defied as “any data appended beyond the nominal
end of the PE image” (Hnatiw, Robinson, Sheehan, & Suan, 2007). Hnatiw et al. also explain
that unlike other sections of the PE file, overlays are not automatically loaded into memory by
Windows at execution time, existing only on disk initially. As it pertains to machine learning
models whose input is the entire raw bytes of a file, file overlays will still be considered by
the model. Kolosnjaji et al. (2018) made one of the first attempts at embedding adversarial
bytes within a PE file. Although the authors never use the term “overlay”, their strategy of
appending bytes to the end of the file is one of the first known examples of an adversarial
attack utilizing file overlays.
The data normally contained within PE overlays need not be homogeneous, and
examples of legitimate use cases include certificates, debugging information, and data
appended by packing utilities such as UPX (Hnatiw et al., 2007). Hnatiw et al. refer to each of
these individual items as overlay regions. Although the mere presence of an overlay is
insufficient to determine maliciousness of a file, only 30% of benign PE files contain an
overlay, whereas twice as many malicious files contain one (Hnatiw et al., 2007). Finally, as
certificates are the most common use case for legitimate PE overlays, binary analysis tools
such as PEiD will automatically attempt to extract certificates, making a distinction between
certificates and the rest of the overlay.
Another common technique for embedding data within PE files is via slack space.
Slack space refers to unused space that may be present at the end of section. This situation
arises when the amount of data within a section is less than the section size allocated at
compile time (Shin, Kim, Byun & Lee, 2008). Shin et al. used slack space to demonstrate a
data hiding technique in which they embedded an encrypted JPEG image within a PE file.
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As a more precise definition, slack space is present when a section’s SizeOfRawData
field is less than the VirtualSize field, occurring when compilers round sizes up to align
sections on a boundary (Goppit, 2006). As was also the case with overlays, Goppit notes that
slack space is unused and is therefore not loaded into memory at execution time. For an
attacker to introduce new embedded code that is loaded into memory at runtime, they would
also need to increase the VirtualSize field accordingly. Finally, Goppit also demonstrates
that compilers always fill slack space with null bytes (0x00) by default. This is important to
point out for the purpose of introducing adversarial bytes, as the use of any other value within
slack space could potentially raise some red flags. It may therefore be advisable to make a
corresponding increase to the VirtualSize in this situation as well. This effectively reduces
the slack space size, making the adversarial bytes appear to be within the actual section data
instead. This change is unlikely to break functionality, as no pre-existing code would have a
CALL

or JMP instruction destined for this new location. A visualization of slack space can be

seen in Figure 5, where the hexdump utility shows a cave of null bytes appearing between the
code and data sections of a PE file.

Figure 5. Slack space appearing after the code section in notepad.exe.
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If insufficient slack space exists, it is also possible to enlarge an existing section
(Goppit, 2006). Goppit suggests that this is only practical to perform with the very last section
in the file, however, as the need to adjust pointers makes this task practically impossible to do
with other sections without re-compiling. He then provides instructions necessary to extend a
section, which include increasing both the VirtualSize and SizeOfRawData fields for the
final section, and then increasing the SizeOfImage field within the PE header by the same
amount. He mentions that you may want to update the SizeOfCode and
SizeOfInitializedData

fields within the PE header, depending on which section is being

extended. While he suggests that this final step only needs to be performed as a matter of
completeness, as the program will still run either way, an attacker may want to ensure that
these values are accurate to thwart any defenses that may be performing format validation.
The final way to add a significant amount of space to a PE file is to add additional
sections. As updating references throughout the entire file is a nearly impossible task, the new
section should be added after the last existing section at the very end of the file. Goppit (2006)
documented instructions for this task as well. Within the PE header, he states that the
SizeOfImage

and NumberOfSections fields must be updated accordingly. He then says that

a new section header should also be added after the last existing section header, where there
will typically be some space available to add new entries before the actual sections begin. The
new section header will need to include the following fields: a section name, VirtualSize,
VirtualAddress, SizeOfRawData, PointerToRawData,

and Characteristics. Goppit also

provides detailed instructions for how to computer each value, with the only unobvious
considerations being that the virtual address and raw offsets must be aligned to boundaries.
There are numerous ways to embed data when a much smaller amount of space is
required. One such attack involves using the space occupied by unimportant fields within the
MS-DOS header, as only the e_magic and e_lfanew fields are needed to load executables on
modern systems (Demetrio, Biggio, Lagorio, Roli & Armando, 2019). A research group
consisting of many of the same authors later extended this concept to include overwriting
bytes within the MS-DOS stub as well (Demetrio et al., 2021b). The authors refer to the
original attack as the Partial DOS attack and the latter as a Full DOS attack. The attacks are
pictured in Figure 6.
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Demetrio et al. (2021b) also propose an attack called Extend, whereby the MS-DOS
header is enlarged, creating additional space before the start of the PE header. As was the case
with other techniques, it requires section offsets to be adjusted accordingly. The authors also
propose an attack called Shift, where new space is created by shifting a section forward. The
Shift and Extend attacks are pictured in Figure 6.

Figure 6. Payload locations in PE files, inspired by Demetrio et al. (2021b).

Up to this point, the techniques discussed in this section largely revolve around
carving out contiguous chunks of data within the PE file by adding or extending sections,
appending a file overlay, or abusing the file format by overwriting data within unnecessary
header fields. Another approach is to make a series of functionality preserving operations.
Anderson et al. (2018) describes several examples of functionality preserving operations,
which comprise the action space of their reinforcement learning-based attack:
•

Adding an unused function to the Import Address Table (IAT)

•

Adding an unused section, as previously discussed

19
•

Adding space to the end of a section by utilizing slack space, as previously
discussed

•

Adding space to the end of a file by utilizing overlays, as previous discussed

•

Adding a new entry point that jumps to the original entry point

•

Modifying section names

•

Modifying the header checksum

•

Modifying debug info

•

Removing signer information

•

Packing or unpacking the binary

Finally, a technique that allows for more fine-grained manipulations of a PE file is
through code transformations. Song et al. (2020) describes four types of transformations that
are used to achieve this goal. First, an instruction can be replaced with a semantically
equivalent instruction of the same length. A prime example is adding a negative instead of
subtracting a positive. Second, the authors suggest reassigning registers within a function,
provided that other code is not dependent on them. For example, instructions using the EBX
register could be changed to use the ECX register, and vice-versa. Third, instructions can be
re-ordered after careful consideration for dependencies, ideally using a dependency graph.
Last, the order that registers are pushed and popped onto the stack across functional calls can
be changed. These transformations are an adaptation of a technique known as in-place code
randomization, first proposed by Pappas, Polychronakis, & Keromytis (2012) as a defense
against return-oriented programming (ROP).
Although seemingly not well documented within published literature on code
transformations, a blog post by Woodruff (2020) proposes hiding messages within x86
binaries using a trick known as semantic duals. Woodruff starts by demonstrating the
previously discussed concept of semantically equivalent instructions. For example, he shows
that the following operation of zeroing out the EAX register can be performed in the
following ways:
•

xor eax, eax

•

and eax, 0

•

mov eax, 0

•

sub eax, eax
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•

lea eax, [0]

Woodruff (2020) takes this concept one step further by abusing the ModR/M byte,
noting that register-to-memory and memory-to-register representations allow for the previous
example of xor eax, eax, to have two possible encodings, as either 31 C0 or 33 C0. The
author calls this phenomenon a semantic dual, which he defines as different opcodes for the
same instruction family that also share the same length, behavior, and performance. He
documents a short list of semantic duals that he was able to locate within the X86 instruction
set, which include certain variations of the ADD, ADC, AND, OR, XOR, SUB, SBB, MOV, and CMP
instructions.

Machine Learning and Deep Learning
Arthur Samuel first coined the term “machine learning”, where he described a system
capable of learning from experience rather than being explicitly programmed (Samuel, 1967).
Machine learning systems learn by using data to build decision models. The data used to train
the models is referred to as training data, where individual inputs are called training instances
or samples. The accuracy of the model is then validated using a testing set. Different datasets
are used for training and testing to ensure the model is extracting meaningful patterns as
opposed to simply remembering previously observed samples. Machine learning systems can
be classified into four categories, largely based on the level of human supervision required to
train the model. The categories include:
•

Supervised learning

•

Unsupervised learning

•

Semi-supervised learning

•

Reinforcement learning

This dissertation examines a supervised learning technique known as classification,
where models are used to predict the class (or label) of new data. In the context of malware
classification, the two labels used for the purposes of this research are malicious and benign.
When only two labels are present, the problem is also referred to as a binary classification
problem. In classic machine learning systems, the model determines the classification using a

21
set of predictive features. The human-driven process of deciding what features would be
useful to use as predictors is known as feature engineering.
A loss function is used to evaluate how well a model is performing, with the value
returned from the function being referred to as the loss. Binary classification problems will
often use a loss function known as cross-entropy loss.
Examples of important supervised learning algorithms include linear regression,
logistic regression, support vector machines (SVMs), random forests, and neural networks.
Artificial Neural Netwoks (ANNs) are modeled after the human brain and how biological
neurons may operate, though their modern-day implementation is far different. The most
basic unit within an ANN is the perceptron. A perceptron multiplies each input by a weight
and adds them together to produce a weighted sum, after which a step function is applied. A
perception is pictured in Figure 7.

Figure 7. A modern perceptron, as originally conceived by Rosenblatt (1958).

Stacking multiple perceptrons together creates a network capable of solving problems.
A Multilayer Perceptron (MLP) is formed when several layers of stacked perceptrons are used
together, including an input layer, one or more hidden layers, and an output layer. In a
classification MLP, a softmax function is often used to ensure probabilities all lie between 0
and 1, and that the probabilities for each class add up to 1 (Géron, 2019). When each neuron
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in a layer is connected to all other neurons in an adjacent layer, it can be referred to as a fullyconnected layer (Géron, 2019). A simple MLP is pictured in Figure 8.

Figure 8. A simple MLP neural network used for classification.

An MLP is the most basic type of neural network. Deep learning, or deep neural
networks (DNNs), refers to neural networks containing large numbers of layers. They often
excel at tasks requiring high dimensional inputs, such as image classification, speech
recognition, or natural language processing. DNNs therefore don’t always require a feature
engineering phase, as some neural networks are designed to directly handle raw input such as
images. These are often referred to as end-to-end or featureless models. Deep learning has
become extremely popular in the last decade due to advances in compute power, graphical
processing units (GPUs), algorithmic improvements, and the widespread availability of larger
quantities of data.
High dimensional inputs such as images often make it impractical to fully connect
each input. A more desirable and less computationally expensive approach is to connect local
regions of the input instead. This approach is typically achieved using Convolutional Neural
Networks. A CNN typically includes convolutional layers, pooling layers, and fully connected
layers (Stanford University, n.d.).
Convolutional layers are used to learn higher-level feature representations about the
raw input data. They achieve this by sliding a small filter across the raw input. The filter (or
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kernel) is merely a small collection of learned weights. Convolution is applied by computing
dot products of the kernel entries and the input in each region, producing an activation map
(or feature map).
A pooling layer then applies a downsampling operation to reduce the size of the
activation map, largely to limit the number of connections required within the fully connected
layers, thereby decreasing computational costs. A max pooling layer is the most common,
where a maximum value is calculated for each patch within the feature maps. A stride and
filter size are the two required hyperparameters used to define the degree to which scaling will
occur. An example of a max pooling layer can be found in Figure 9. Likewise, an average
pooling layer calculates an average value for each patch. An L2 norm pooling layer is another
less common option.

Figure 9. Demonstration of a max pooling layer.

Asokan (2020) explains that another beneficial byproduct of pooling layers is the
introduction of local translation invariance to the network. Translation invariance is a property
describing the detection of a feature regardless of its location within the input. Asokan further
explains that convolutional filters learn local features for a given input without considering
them in a global context.
After the size of the data representation is reduced by the pooling layer, fully
connected layers then create connections between each of the activations, using matrix
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multiplication to generate the final class scores. These layers behave much like the standard
ANNs described earlier in the section.
Recurrent Neural Networks (RNNs) are another form of neural network ideal for use
with sequence prediction problems, as CNNs are unable to handle variable length sequence
data. RNNs are typically used for applications such as handwriting recognition and speech
recognition. They operate by maintaining an internal state that is updated at each timestep.
The use of RNNs was briefly considered by the authors of MalConv but will not play a central
role in this dissertation (Raff et al., 2018a).

Adversarial Examples
Szegedy et al. (2013) first demonstrated that neural networks were vulnerable to
adversarial examples, describing the neural networks as containing “intrinsic blind spots” and
“counter-intuitive properties”. The authors applied an optimization procedure in which small
imperceivable changes were introduced to network inputs such that the target model’s
prediction error was maximized. The research literature frequently refers to these changes as
perturbations.
Goodfellow et al. (2014) later proposed a simple and fast method for generating
adversarial examples, which they refer to as the Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM). Their
algorithm first computes the gradient of the network’s cost function using backpropagation.
They then compute the sign of the gradient and multiply it by a small epsilon value to reduce
the perceivability of changes. Finally, the authors then add the resulting vector to the original
input to yield the adversarial example. The mathematical representation of FGSM is
expressed in Equation 1. A visual demonstration can be found in Equation 1 within the
introductory chapter of this dissertation.

Equation 1. Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM).

The FGSM is a type of white-box attack, meaning the attacker knows all information
about the model, to include its hyperparameters and model weights (Yuan et al., 2019). On the
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contrary, a black-box attack involves an attacker with no knowledge of the target network
(Yuan et al., 2019). A black-box attack is often the most relevant scenario for malware
classification problems, as antivirus products are unlikely to expose details regarding their
internal models.
In adaptive black-box attacks the model acts as an oracle, whereby an attacker is
allowed to provide inputs to the model and observe the corresponding outputs, very much like
a chosen-plaintext attack in the field of cryptography (Chakraborty et al., 2018). This is akin
to providing various files to an anti-virus product and then observing if the product classifies
them as malicious or benign. The attacker will often use the resulting input-output tuples to
train a local surrogate model, where white-box attacks can then be utilized (Chakraborty et al.,
2018). Therefore, most adversarial examples are crafted using white-box attacks and can later
be transferred to black-box targets when necessary (Yuan et al., 2019). Given that many
black-box attack scenarios ultimately utilize white-box attacks behind the scenes, the
importance of research exploring white-box attacks within the malware classification domain
is surprisingly more relevant than one might initially expect.
In other scenarios it may be possible for the attacker to gain knowledge about the
models’ training data distribution, which forms the basis of a non-adaptive black-box attack
(Chakraborty et al., 2018). Just as in the previous scenario, the attacker uses this information
to train a local model that allows for the use of white-box attacks (Chakraborty et al., 2018).
Adversarial examples can have varying attack goals, to include confidence reduction,
non-targeted misclassifications, or targeted misclassifications (Aryal, Gupta, & Abdelsalam,
2021). Targeted attacks attempt to cause models to output a classification of the attacker’s
choosing, whereas non-targeted attacks seek to cause any misclassification to occur without
regard to a specific outcome (Yuan et al., 2019). The relative difficulty of attack goals and
capabilities can be seen in Figure 10.
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Figure 10. Difficulty of adversarial attacks, adapted from Chakraborty et al. (2018).

With binary classification problems it can be observed that targeted and non-targeted
attacks are equivalent (Yuan et al., 2019). When generating an adversarial example using a
malicious executable, for example, the adversary can either directly target the benign
classification label, or alternatively seek to cause a non-targeted misclassification to occur
with respect to the malicious class. Following the successful completion of either attack, a
benign classification is output by the model. This demonstrates that targeted and non-targeted
attacks produce identical outcomes when applied to binary classification tasks.
Kurakin, Goodfellow, & Bengio (2016) later adapted FGSM to work with targeted
attacks in an approach called One-Step Target Class Method (OTCM). The modified
algorithm works by using a target label instead of the actual label, and then subtracting the
resulting perturbation from the input instead of adding it, as shown in Equation 2 (Kurakin et
al., 2016). The difference in implementation amounts to minimizing the loss with respect to a
target classification instead of maximizing the loss with respect to the actual classification.

Equation 2. One-Step Target Class Method.

Kurakin et al. (2016) also proposed an iterative version of FGSM that they call the
Basic Iterative Method (BIM). BIM applies FGSM multiple times using small step sizes,
clipping the perturbation at each iteration to prevent large changes from occurring (Kurakin et
al. 2016). The authors also apply an iterative approach the targeted version of FGSM, which
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also uses small changes that are clipped at each iteration. The authors call this algorithm the
Iterative Least-Likely Class Method (ILLC). After the introduction of iterative attacks, FGSM
and OTCM became known as one-time attacks in the research literature (Yuan et al., 2019).
Each of the previously described algorithms can be used by the attackers with different
goals. Adversarial examples can aim to generate either false negatives or false positives
(Yuan et al., 2019). A false positive is a type 1 error in which a negative sample is classified
with a positive label, and a false negative is a type 2 error in which a positive sample is
classified with a negative label (Yuan et al., 2019). Using malware classification as an
example, a false positive occurs when an attacker gets a benign sample to misclassify as
malicious, and a false negative occurs when an attacker gets a malicious sample to misclassify
as benign (Yuan et al., 2019).

Malware Detection
Antivirus products traditionally used signature-based methods for detecting malicious
files, but an inability to detect previously unseen malware samples led to the rise of
behavioral-based detection methods (Aryal et al., 2021). Modern day antivirus products now
employ a hybrid approach, utilizing both signature- and behavioral-based methods (Aryal et
al., 2021).
According to Malanov (2016), a signature is a contiguous sequence of bytes used to
uniquely identify a malware sample. In common usage the term is used more broadly to
describe any entry within an antivirus database used to identify a known piece of malware
(Malanov, 2016). Sikorski & Honig (2012) explain a common method used to identify these
unique sequences of bytes within programs, whereby human analysts can use a utility known
as strings to search a binary program for human-readable text. The text appears as a series of
ASCII or Unicode characters followed by a NULL terminator (Sikorski & Honig, 2012).
Sikorski & Honig (2012) also describe another common signature found in malware
databases known as a cryptographic hash. They demonstrate that hashing algorithms such as
Message-Digest Algorithm 5 (MD5) and Secure Hash Algorithm 1 (SHA1) can be used to
uniquely identify a file, and that searching for the resulting hash in an online malware
database can determine if the file has been flagged by an antivirus vendor as malicious. Each
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antivirus vendor will have different signatures in their database, making search results for a
cryptographic hash vary between each product (Sikorski & Honig, 2012).
By the year 2018, an astounding 376,639 new malware samples were being created
every single day, or roughly 4.4 per second (AV-TEST, 2020). Gibert, Mateu, & Planes
(2020) attribute the large proliferation of malware samples in part due to the use of
polymorphic and metamorphic malware. The authors show that signature-based detection
techniques have quickly lost effectiveness, unable to keep pace with the rapid increase in new
malware variants. Signature-based approaches lack scalability due to the upfront analysis
required by a human expert (Gibert, Mateu, & Planes, 2020).
Despite obvious shortcomings in the ability to detect zero-day malware, signaturebased methods are still employed within modern anti-virus products as part of a hybrid
approach to detection (Aryal et al., 2021). Key advantages of signature-based methods are
their fast lookup speeds and extremely low false positive rates (Aryal et al., 2021). By
consulting a hash database as the first step in a hybrid detection pipeline, a positive match
within the database would allow computationally expensive steps to be skipped, thereby
improving the overall speed and efficiency of the detection system (Chen et al., 2019).
Schultz, Eskin, Zadok, & Stolfo (2000) were the first to propose using machine
learning algorithms to classify executable programs. The authors successfully demonstrated
that their method could detect previously unseen malicious executables, achieving a 97.76%
detection rate using the Multi-Naïve Bayes algorithm. The authors reported that their machine
learning-based detection method was able to identify over twice as many malicious
executables as antivirus products using traditional methods.
The input to machine learning models is typically generated using feature engineering,
where an expert identifies important properties that should be extracted from each sample
(Ling et al., 2021). With respect to Windows PE malware detection, features can be extracted
either statically, dynamically, or even in a hybrid fashion (Ling et al., 2021). Static features
are gathered without running the executable, whereas dynamic features rely on monitoring
runtime characteristics in a sandbox environment (Ling et al., 2021).
Examples of static features include readable strings, header information, opcodes, API
imports, and even byte sequences (Ling et al., 2021). Examples of features gathered
dynamically include system calls, CPU utilization, and network calls (Ling et al., 2021).
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Figure 11 demonstrates how engineered features are used as the input to a variety of machine
learning models.

Figure 11. ML malware detection workflow, adapted from Ling et al. (2021).

N-grams are a popular feature used within malware detection models, often used with
either raw bytes or assembly instructions (Raff et al., 2018b). N-grams can be generated
statically and with little domain knowledge necessary, as they work by extracting every
unique combination of n bytes or n assembly instructions (Raff et al., 2018b). Their relative
ease of use and ability to achieve accuracies above 95% make them an extremely attractive
option for malware detection models (Raff et al., 2018b).

Deep Learning for Malware Detection
The use of deep neural networks for malware detection appears quite frequently in the
research literature throughout the past decade, with earlier approaches focusing primarily on
models requiring up-front feature engineering. Motivation for end-to-end raw byte models
stems from the desire to eliminate the need for domain expertise and manual feature selection,
and to take advantage of powerful and readily available deep learning APIs (Anderson, 2017).
Libraries such as Tensorflow, Theano, Keras, Caffe, and Torch have made state of the art
deep learning architectures readily available to the masses with only a few lines of code
(Anderson, 2017). Deep learning techniques driven by these libraries were dominating
leaderboards for problems within other domains (Anderson, 2017).
At the Black Hat USA 2015, Davis & Wolff (2015) built a deep CNN using
disassembled instructions from Windows PE files and then briefly discussed the challenges
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associated with using raw-byte classifiers. The disassembled instructions allowed for much
smaller inputs than using the full raw bytes of a file, making it a much more feasible approach
at the time (Wolff & Davis, 2015).
Saxe & Berlin (2015) demonstrated the feasibility of building and deploying a deep
learning-based malware classifier capable of delivering fast results with high accuracy. Their
deep neural network was trained on 400,000 binaries and resulted in a 95% detection rate at a
0.1% FPR. The model uses a feature engineering approach in which several of the features are
extracted using traditional methods such as PE imports and PE metadata. A unique addition to
the input features includes a histogram of byte entropy values obtained by sliding a 1024-byte
window across the input binary in step increments of 256 bytes, computing an entropy value
for each window (Saxe & Berlin, 2015). This unique approach provides some context as to
the file’s byte values without the need to keep large amounts of binary content in memory,
thus allowing for a small, fixed length feature vector that greatly reduces the memory and
CPU constraints necessary for training and loading the model (Saxe & Berlin, 2015).
Anderson (2017) later proposed MalwaResNet, a semi-successful prototype of an endto-end raw byte model. MalwaResNet is an adaption of the popular ResNet architecture, using
a 34-layer deep neural network to determine the maliciousness of a file (Anderson, 2017). The
classifier splits input files into multiple chunks to allow them to fit within memory in most
GPUs (Anderson, 2017). The results were unimpressive, with models taking days to train and
still only yielding an 84.7% true positive rate (Anderson, 2017).
Raff et al. (2018a) later proposed MalConv, a CNN-based raw-byte malware classifier
designed to overcome many of the complexity and accuracy issues present in previous end-toend deep learning models. MalConv is a relatively shallow network capable of processing raw
byte sequences of over two million bytes (Raff et al., 2018a). An illustration of the MalConv
architecture can be found in Figure 12.
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Figure 12. MalConv architecture, adapted from Raff et al. (2018a).

New inputs into MalConv will first undergo a tokenization step, where each byte value
is shifted up by one such that byte 0x00 corresponds to a token value of 1 (Raff et al., 2018a).
The token value of 0 is then used represent padding at the end of the file (Raff et al., 2018a).
The architecture then converts each token to an 8-dimensional vector using a trainable
embedding layer, preventing the model from interpreting byte values as if they were
intrinsically closer to other byte values (Raff et al., 2018a).
To best provide location invariance, a convolutional network architecture was selected
for the next phase of the model, allowing for detection of malicious features even if they
appear at different locations amongst various malware samples (Raff et al., 2018a). By
combining convolutional activations with a max-pooling layer, the activations will be
produced regardless of where the features are located within the input file (Raff et al., 2018a).
Max-pooling was selected over average-pooling because malicious features may only occur
once within a file (Raff et al., 2018a). The use of average-pooling would prevent parts of the
file with high activations from being nullified by smaller activations that occur at much higher
frequencies throughout the remainder of the file (Raff et al., 2018a). Large convolutional
filters of width 500 and an aggressive stride length of 500 were selected as to limit GPU
memory consumption during backpropagation and improve the balance of computational
workloads (Raff et al., 2018a).
Raff et al. (2018a) demonstrated the efficiency and accuracy of the MalConv
architecture by testing on a dataset with over 2 million binaries, of which roughly half of the
samples were malicious and half were benign. Results show that MalConv continues to
improve with larger training sets and provides a strong ability to generalize, whereas prior
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byte n-gram approaches would tend to plateau in part due to susceptibility to overfitting (Raff
et al., 2018a). When trained on the large dataset of over 2 million binaries, MalConv showed
an accuracy of 94.0 and AUC of 98.1 on one test set, and an accuracy of 90.9 and AUC of
98.2 on another test set (Raff et al., 2018a).
Anderson & Roth (2018) curated the EMBER dataset of over 1.1 million binaries and
then used it to train another version of MalConv. Due to memory constraints when using two
Titan X (Pascal) GPUs, the authors elected to use a batch size of 100 rather than 256, and 1
MB binary sizes instead of 2 MB (Anderson & Roth, 2018). The pre-trained weight files were
then publicly released on Github for use within the research community (Anderson & Roth,
2018).
Krcál, Švec, Bálek, & Jasek (2018) independently developed an end-to-end CNNbased malware classifier with similar properties as MalConv. Both architectures use an 8dimensional embedding layer followed by convolutional layers. By contrast, the architecture
proposed by Krcál et al. (2018) is much deeper, contains smaller kernel sizes and stride
lengths, and uses a global average pooling layer instead of a global max pooling layer. Krcál
et al. (2018) trained and evaluated their model using a much larger dataset of 20 million
unpacked Windows PE files, provided by Avast. The authors report slightly better
performance than MalConv, with higher accuracy and AUC scores. Other researchers would
later begin referring to this model as AvastConv (Raff et al., 2020). A comparison of the two
architectures can be seen in Figure 13.
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Figure 13. Comparison of CNN architectures, adapted from Krcál et al. (2018).

Fleshman, Raff, Zak, McLean, & Nicholas (2018b) conducted a study comparing
machine learning based malware detection systems such as MalConv and byte n-gram models
against four top commercial anti-virus products, evaluating their robustness after applying a
series of four non-adversarial attacks. The attacks include applying benign modifications,
destructive byte-level manipulations, injecting return-oriented programming instructions, and
packing the binaries. The authors reported that the two machine learning systems were far
more successful at detecting malware when evasive techniques were applied. They conclude
that machine learning systems are far better at generalizing malicious behavior. The
traditional AV products had rigid decision boundaries and were easily fooled by the simplest
of modifications (Fleshman et al., 2018b).
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Practical Adversarial Attacks Against MalConv
Adversarial attacks using Windows PE files used to be very theoretical in nature,
where many papers within the research literature would propose outputting representative
feature vectors instead of fully runnable programs (Park & Yener, 2020). Researchers even
considered simpler goals, such as preserving the correct format of a Windows PE file,
deferring preservation of functionality to future research (Ling et al., 2021). As shown in
Figure 14, preservation of maliciousness requires preservation of functionality, which in turn
requires preservation of the file format (Ling et al., 2021). Simpler goals could also include a
reduction in confidence levels if unable to achieve a misclassification (Aryal et al., 2021).

Figure 14. Relationship between preservation goals, inspired by Ling et al. (2021).

Kolosnjaji et al. (2018) first described an attack against MalConv in which bytes are
appended to the end of a target PE file to ensure that the file’s functionality remains intact. A
primary challenge the authors must overcome is MalConv’s non-differentiable embedding
layer. The authors solve this by embedding each padding byte, computing a gradient with
respect to the embedded representation of the byte, and then mapping backwards to input
space by finding the closest byte value (0-255) to the gradient-adjusted embedded
representation. The formal attack algorithm proposed by Kolosnjaji et al. (2018) can be seen
in Figure 15.
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Figure 15. MalConv attack algorithm proposed by Kolosnjaji et al. (2018).

Kolosnjaji et al. (2018) compared their proposed gradient-based attack to a random
byte attack. The authors report that the gradient-based attack performed significantly better,
achieving an evasion rate of over 60% after appending 10,000 bytes to the file, where success
rates appeared to grow linearly based on the number of appended bytes. The distribution of
byte values within the final payload was expectedly uniform for the randomized byte attack,
but the gradient-based attack resulted in an extremely sparse set of byte values (Kolosnjaji et
al., 2018). A notable limitation to the attack is payload sizes having to fit within the remaining
padding space between the end of the file and the input model’s maximum length (Kolosnjaji
et al., 2018). Files that are larger than the 2 MB input size allowed by MalConv must be
truncated, making this attack impossible since a payload appended to the end of the file would
be removed prior to its consumption into the detection model.
Kreuk et al. (2018) show that payloads can be re-positioned to other spots within the
executable without losing their effectiveness. The authors also demonstrate that working
payloads can be transferred to different executables altogether with a 75% success rate.
The attack by Kolosnjaji et al. (2018) perturbs each payload byte one at a time. Kreuk
et al. (2018) proposed a new attack utilizing the Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM, thereby
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perturbing all payload bytes at the same time. The attack runs bytes through the embedding
layer to obtain an embedded representation of each byte, iteratively runs FGSM on the
embedded bytes until evasion is achieved, and then attempts to map backwards through the
embedding layer by locating the closest possible byte (Kruek et al., 2019). The improved
algorithm achieved an approximate 99% evasion rate with payload lengths greatly decreasing
to lengths between 500 and 1000 bytes (Kreuk et al., 2018). The attack algorithm proposed by
Kreuk et al. (2018) can be seen in Figure 16.

Figure 16. MalConv attack algorithm proposed by Kreuk et al. (2018).
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, MalConv uses convolutional activations and a
temporal-max-pooling layer to produce activations regardless of where features appear within
a given input file (Raff et al., 2018a). Kreuk et al. (2018) explain that adversarial attacks
against MalConv work by producing large activations that mimic highly benign features,
thereby acting as a distraction for the malicious code. Suciu et al. (2019) further explains that
MalConv only uses the best 128 activations, resulting in legitimate features being quickly
replaced by those from the appended payload in the temporal-max-pooling operation.
Observing that the convergence time of gradient-based attacks appears to grow
linearly based on payload size, Suciu et al. (2019) propose a non-iterative, “one shot” Fast
Gradient Method (FGM). Results show that success rates increase dramatically based on the
quality and robustness of the trained model. Using a payload size of 10,000 bytes with the
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newly proposed one-shot FGM attack, the authors achieved a success rate of 1% on a model
trained with a small dataset, 33% on the EMBER-trained MalConv model, and 71% on a
model trained with a large production-quality dataset (Suciu et al., 2019). The small dataset
contained less than 10,000 samples and was intended to mimic the size and distribution of the
dataset used by Kolosnjaji et al. (2018). The large dataset contained 16.3 million binaries and
was produced by using stratified sampling on a larger dataset of over 33 million binaries
(Suciu et al., 2019). The use of stratified sampling limited overrepresented of popular
malware families, ensured less bias was present, and led to a more uniform distribution of
various binary types (Suciu et al., 2019).
Demetrio et al. (2019) demonstrated that MalConv can be evaded by modifying only a
select few bytes within the DOS header. The authors then use feature attribution to show that
MalConv does not learn meaningful features from the data or text sections of executables, but
rather tends to make decisions based on activations produced from within the PE header.
Demetrio et al. (2021b) later extend upon their previous research by introducing three
additional Windows PE modification techniques. The authors include these attacks in
RAMEN, their newly proposed framework for creating and optimizing practical adversarial
malware. The new PE modification techniques are named Full DOS, Extend, and Shift. The
Full DOS attack makes use of the entire DOS header except for the leading “magic byte” field
and the e_lfanew pointer (Demetrio et al., 2021b). The Extend attack attempts to enlarge the
DOS header by adjusting various fields such as the offset to the PE header (Demetrio et al.,
2021b). The Shift attack will move the content of the first section forward to create more
space, requiring values from various header fields to be adjusted (Demetrio et al., 2021b). The
authors released implementations of each attack in an open-source Github respository called
SecML Malware.
Adversarial attacks against malware classifiers are not limited to gradient-based
attacks. Anderson et al. (2018) demonstrated the use of reinforcement learning to attack
models in a black-box scenario. The authors believe the attack more closely mimics a real-life
scenario in which attackers will not have access to information about the internal machine
learning models used by anti-virus vendors. A reinforcement learning agent makes
modifications to the target binary using an action space consisting of various functionality
preserving options such as altering section names or creating new but unused sections
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(Anderson et al., 2018). Although not specifically mentioned within the paper, the authors
provide a link to an open-source Github repository for the project, where MalConv is
available as a target model.

Adversarial Defenses for PE Files
Defenses against adversarial malware samples is an underdeveloped area of research,
especially as it pertains to end-to-end models. According to a recent survey paper by Park &
Yener (2020), it remains unclear if many defenses proposed for use with adversarial images
will work within the adversarial malware domain. The authors specifically cite smoothing and
randomization as ideas for future research directions within the malware classification
domain.
Fleshman, Raff, Sylvester, Forsyth, & McLean (2018a) propose a modified version of
MalConv that appears to offer one of the strongest defenses against adversarial attacks. The
authors suggest using non-negative weights only, in which classifiers only learn features
associated with the positive (malicious) class. The goal is that attackers would not be able to
add adversarial bytes to a file to make it appear more benign, as they would fail to produce a
strong activation within MalConv. This forces the attacker to instead remove malicious
features as a means of lowering the maliciousness score, which is itself a desirable outcome
from a defense perspective. The authors reported that non-negative MalConv models
prevented nearly all adversarial attacks from occurring. One drawback is that the authors
reported lower detection rates, in which the accuracy dropped from 94.1% with the original
MalConv model to 89.4% with the non-negative MalConv model.
The most common defense used by malware detection models is adversarial training.
Adversarial training is the process of augmenting training data with adversarial examples to
produce a hardened and robust network capable of defending against adversarial attacks
(Shafahi et al., 2019). Despite its success with most applications, adversarial training incurs
an extremely high computational cost, often taking 3-30 times longer than the normal training
process (Shafahi et al., 2019). This is considered an unacceptable cost in some instances, as
the normal training process can be extremely expensive on its own. Consider, for example,
that a popular pre-trained MalConv model released with the EMBER dataset had been trained
using dual Titan X (Pascal) GPUs for 10 days (Anderson & Roth, 2018). Performance
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considerations aside, Chen et al. (2019) showed that the introduction of adversarial examples
into the training process would significantly reduce the likelihood of a successful evasion
attack against MalConv. Unfortunately, their research also showed that the introduction of
large amounts of adversarial examples into the training process also resulted in malware
samples being incorrectly classified as benign after having previously been classified
correctly without the use of adversarial training. Moreover, Demetrio et al. (2021b) state that
adversarial training is and will likely remain an ineffective technique due to the high
dimensionality of input space required within the malware domain.
Taking model defense in a different direction, a survey paper by Park & Yener (2020)
suggested that future research should attempt to use pre-processing steps and detection
pipelines as opposed to relying on the machine learning models alone. Research has indeed
started to move in that direction. Chen et al. (2019) proposed a pre-detection mechanism to
reject adversarial examples before they enter the MalConv classifier. In their proposal, the
authors suggest creating a hash of both the code section of the executable and the full file
itself, and then storing both of those hashes in a database. They reason that if a future input
contains an identical code section to a previously identified piece of malware, but the hashes
of the two files are different, then someone has likely tampered with that previous malware
sample to evade detection. An illustration of this architecture can be found in Figure 17. The
authors report that their experiment successfully rejected 100% of adversarial examples that
they attempted to use. Furthermore, while detection pipelines often lead to increased
processing times, the authors demonstrated that CPU usage was minimal and could even
make the pipeline more efficient than using MalConv alone, as finding known malware in the
database through the hash lookup process would allow you to skip the MalConv model
altogether. They found that this efficiency increase occurred when malware exceeded 0.26%
of the input files being tested. Finally, the authors conclude by noting that the introduction of
a MySQL database could introduce vulnerabilities of its own, and future adversarial attacks
utilizing the code section of the executable could be much more difficult to detect. Finally,
note that the pre-detection mechanism may have been inspired by SafetyNet, an architecture
which attempts to detect adversarial examples before entering the machine learning model
(Lu, Issaranon, & Forsyth, 2017).
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Figure 17. The pre-detection mechanism, adapted from Chen et al. (2019).
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CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
This chapter will propose several novel techniques for improving adversarial attacks
against MalConv. A design science research methodology will be used, where several new
technical innovations will be presented and then validated, largely using statistical differencemaking experiments. Attacks described in previous studies will first be implemented and
included in a new attack tool called BitCamo, with the original attacks serving as a baseline
for comparison to the proposed improvements. The new attack tool will also assist in growing
the limited number of open-source tools available to create adversarial examples using
Windows PE files. Specific implementation details for this research artifact and its proposed
improvements will be discussed in great depth throughout in this chapter. This chapter
concludes by providing discussion about how the newly proposed treatments will be
validated, to include careful attention to dataset selection.

Design Science
The attacks proposed in this chapter are technical innovations requiring a problemsolving paradigm, which describe a design science research methodology (Hevner, March,
Park, & Ram, 2014). Wieringa (2014, p. 3) defines design science as “the design and
investigation of artifacts in context”. He outlines a repeatable problem-solving process for
conducting design science research, which he calls the engineering cycle. He outlines five
major stages within this cycle:
•

Problem investigation

•

Treatment Design

•

Treatment Validation

•

Treatment Implementation

•

Treatment Evaluation
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Design science research begin with a design problem, which Wieringa (2014, p. 15)
defines as “a problem to (re)design an artifact so that it better contributes to the achievement
of some goal”. Artifacts include items such as software, algorithms, or frameworks, and can
be more broadly defined as anything developed by someone to serve a practical purpose
(Wieringa, 2014, p. 29). Similarly, a treatment can be defined as the way in which these
artifacts interact with their problem contexts (Wieringa, 2014, p. 28). Treatment validation
ensures that the treatment will support stakeholder goals if implemented and is generally
performed in a laboratory setting (Wieringa, 2014, p. 31). Treatment evaluation will assess if
the treatment is successful when used by stakeholders in a real-world setting (Wieringa, 2014,
p. 31).
The design problems being addressed are low or inconsistent success rates for attacks,
high computational costs for attacks, and the inability for attacks to work when a predetection mechanism is employed. The attack tool is the artifact, and when the attack tool is
run against executables with the new improvements enabled, it will be referred to as the
treatment. The population is a diverse collection of over 10 million malicious Windows PE
files intended to be representative of all Windows PE files that one may expect to find in a
real-world setting. To perform treatment evaluation, the artifact will be applied to a subset of
samples selected uniformly at random from this population.
Dataset selection will be addressed in a section later in this chapter. Treatment
implementation and design will be discussed throughout this chapter. Treatment validation is
provided with the results presented in chapter 4.

Statistical Difference-Making Experiments
Within the context of design science, many of the experiments performed for this
research can be classified as statistical difference-making experiments. Wieringa (2014, pp.
47-48) explains that statistical difference-making experiments apply treatments to different
subsets of samples drawn from a shared population and then seek to determine if a difference
exists in the average outcomes. In the context of this research, successful outcomes are
determined by the presence of high evasion rates, small average payload sizes, and small
average attack durations.
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Stakeholders
Stakeholders are the people affected by the treatment of a problem (Wieringa, 2014).
According to Wieringa, a stakeholder need not be aware of the existence of a problem nor the
associated treatment, but they must be better off once the problem is treated. It can be argued
that the primary stakeholders and beneficiaries to all malware-related research are therefore
the end users of computer systems. Published malware research, even when offensively
oriented, is consumed by companies offering antivirus products and security solutions, and inturn used to protect end users from malicious software. The open-source library is most likely
to be consumed directly by security researchers, penetration testers, red team operators,
security architects, and machine learning engineers.

Research Questions and Hypotheses
Research Question 1
Can the append-based FGSM attack be re-implemented and improved to achieve consistently
high evasion rates?

Hypothesis 1
Success rates vary widely within the research literature. Dataset and implementation
differences likely play a key role. The attack can likely be re-implemented to achieve
moderately high success rates with payloads of 1000 bytes or less. As payload sizes increase
to several thousand bytes, success rates will likely surpass 99%.

Research Question 2
Can the append-based FGSM attack benefit from a new byte initialization strategy?

Hypothesis 2
Some researchers consider the random byte initialization strategy to be naïve. It likely
performs better than methods that initialize every byte with the same value, but improvements
are likely possible by drawing from a pool of values that are more representative with respect
to the target classification.
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Research Question 3
Can the recently proposed pre-detection mechanism be completely bypassed?

Hypothesis 3
The pre-detection mechanism can be trivially bypassed with almost every sample.

Research Question 4
Can performance of the long-running reconstruction phase of the append-based FGSM attack
be improved?

Hypothesis 4
The reconstruction phase is likely to remain the bottleneck for the attack, but some simple
improvements are likely to make a big difference.

Novel Contributions and Proposed Attack Improvements
An attack tool will be developed and released via open-source website Github for use
within the research community. The lack of readily available and easy-to-use attack software
may contribute to a lack of urgency in developing proper defenses for adversarial attacks. The
lack of publicly available attack software also increases the difficulty to improve upon
existing attacks and discourages continued research into this area. The tool will make every
effort to automatically determine optimal parameters to run the attack with, allowing users to
run the tool without any up-front configuration or need to understand which attack works best
for a given situation.
New payload initialization strategies will be proposed and then evaluated. Previous
researchers indicate that the use of random payload initializations may be a less-than-optimal
strategy (Chen et al., 2019). Simple strategies were attempted first, such as filling the entire
payload with the exact same byte value. Initial attempts exclusively targeted outlier values
and midpoints, to include 0, 1, 128, or 255. After the successful implementation of
performance improvements, this strategy was amended to include all 256 possible byte
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values, reiterating the importance of the engineering cycle described by Wieringa (2014).
While conducting the research, a similar strategy was discovered in a blog post written by
Fleshman (2018a), a co-author of the original MalConv proposal. Fleshman found optimal
results when using byte value 169 (0xA9). The approach used in this dissertation differs in the
following ways:
•

The payload bytes are used as a basis for a gradient-based algorithm instead of
merely appending them to the file without modification. The byte value used to
initialize the payload will not necessarily be reflective of the byte values contained
within the final payload. The results reported in chapter 4 will reinforce this
distinction, as the optimal byte identified by Fleshman results in low evasion rates
after being perturbed by FGSM.

•

Results are gathered over a substantially larger dataset. Fleshman uses 50
executables included as part of a competition dataset, whereas this dissertation
tests all 256 possible byte initialization strategies against 1,000 executables. The
top eight candidates are later tested against an even larger dataset of 5,000
executables to provide validation of the initial results.

•

Fleshman achieves evasion by adding a new section containing 100,000 bytes.
This research will test with using much smaller payloads via use of 1,000-byte file
overlays.

A weighted initialization scheme is also proposed. The intention is to maintain a data
structure containing byte distribution counts from previously successful payloads. Whenever
an attack succeeds, for example, the tool will count how many occurrences of each possible
byte value exist within the payload. Subsequent successful runs will increment counts within
this same data structure. This results in a count for all possible byte values. The weighted
strategy uses this probability distribution to initialize new payloads. Bytes occurring at high
frequencies within successful payloads will therefore appear at high frequencies within newly
initiated payloads. The motivation for this strategy is to give the algorithm a head start,
initiating payloads with values that already resemble successful payloads.
The byte reconstruction phase of the attack appears to be a significant bottleneck in
terms of computation time. Recall that after running a gradient attack against the embedded
representation of the bytes, the embeddings need to be mapped backwards across the
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embedding layer to a byte value in the range 0-255. This dissertation presents three
improvements to improve the speed of the reconstruction phase:
-

Applying reconstruction to the payload bytes only.

-

Adding parallelism.

-

Replacing the L2 distance norm with K-D tree queries.

Psuedocode provided in papers by Kreuk et al. (2018) and Suciu et al. (2019) appear
to indicate that the reconstruction phase should loop over all embeddings. It can instead be
observed that reconstruction only needs to be applied to the embedded payload, as bytes from
the remainder of the file should never change, as this could lead to a loss of functionality. The
rest of the file should therefore always retain their original byte values.
The addition of parallelism is an implementation detail that would not necessarily be
captured in an algorithm’s pseudocode. Given the significant computational cost associated
with this phase of the attack, it was deemed important to verify that this phase can indeed be
parallelized and confirm that it offers a significant improvement in processing time.
It was observed that the L2 distance norm calculations are very much a brute force
strategy. In prior attacks, each possible byte value (0-255) is run through the embedding layer,
with the resulting 8-D embeddings being stored for future reference. This provides a mapping
between all possible byte values and their corresponding embedded representations. This can
be performed once at runtime. Later, after completion of the gradient phase of an attack, each
embedding within the perturbed payload needs to be converted back to a byte value to allow
for creation of a working executable. The perturbed embeddings are unlikely to match one of
the 256 embeddings saved from earlier, so the reconstruction phase instead needs to locate the
closest embedding from the lookup table. For each perturbed embedding within the payload,
an L2 norm is computed between itself and each of the 256 fixed embeddings to determine
which it is closest to. The distance formula is being computed 256 times for each byte within
the payload, resulting in an excessive number of square root operations and comparisons.
This dissertation proposes replacing the L2 distance norm calculations with K-D tree
queries. A K-D tree is a space-partitioning data structure utilizing binary trees and is therefore
capable of performing searches in logarithmic time on average (Bentley, 1975). A
visualization of a K-D tree can be seen in Figure 18. The biggest limitation to K-D trees and
other nearest neighbor search problems are their susceptibility to the “curse of
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dimensionality”, where performance degrades quickly when using high-dimensional data
(Liberty, 2013). On the other hand, K-D trees tend to be very efficient in low-dimensional
space, with Python package sklearn advertising that it works best with a dimensionality of 20
or less (Scikit-learn, n.d.). Additionally, Maneewongvatana & Mount (2001) observed that KD Trees perform well when both the data and the point being queried are of the same
dimension. For these reasons, the 8-D embeddings used within the reconstruction phase
appeared to be extremely fast.

Figure 18. Visualization of a K-D tree in two dimensions.

The reconstruction phase results in a natural loss in precision, as 8-dimensional
vectors of floating-point numbers are converted to single byte values. Gradient attacks against
the embedded representation of bytes can therefore succeed but later fail again after being
converted back to byte values following the reconstruction phase of the attack. Demetrio,
Biggio, Lagorio, Roli, & Armando (2021a) also made this observation, describing that an
attack can succeed in feature space but later fail in input space. To overcome this problem,
this dissertation proposes the use of excessively strong perturbations within embedding space,
such that the perturbed sample will have a greater change of retaining the benign label after
completion of the reconstruction phase.
To achieve stronger perturbations, two changes are made to the original attack
algorithm proposed by Kreuk et al. (2018). First, instead of stopping the gradient attacks after
a MalConv score of 0.50 is reached within embedding space, this dissertation will continue
until a score of at least 0.01 is achieved. Second, the need to reduce the strength of the
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adversary is not as obvious within the malware domain as it is within the image domain. An
excessively strong perturbation is not observable to a human observer in the same way as it is
with images. The tool therefore uses high epsilon values to attack each sample.
Some samples achieve evasion using a very small number of adversarial bytes,
whereas others require somewhat larger sized payloads. Using fixed sized payloads is
therefore suboptimal. The payload size equation provided by Kreuk et al. (2018) allows for
more variance in payload sizes but is suboptimal as well. The speed improvements offered in
this dissertation would allow for a more aggressive search-based approach, where attacks can
be attempted several times with varying payload sizes to determine the smallest payload size
yielding a successful result. While a binary search appears suitable for this situation, the
observation is made that certain samples can fail with larger payload sizes but succeed with
small payload sizes. In these cases, the binary search would result in the payload size
increasing even more after a failure, effectively missing the optimal payload size. A new
payload size minimization algorithm is proposed, beginning by first running the attack using a
50-byte payload, and then iteratively increasing the payload size in 50-byte increments until
the sample finally achieves evasion, up to a user-specified maximum payload size.
Finally, the attack tool will attempt to defeat the pre-detection mechanism by
appending a single byte to the code section when slack space is present. Evasion rates will be
determined by comparing the original code section hash to the modified code section hash and
ensuring a change has occurred.

Tools and Environment
Software artifacts for this research were initially developed on a consumer-grade
laptop using Windows 11 with Windows Subsystem for Linux (WSL) 2. WSL2 was
configured to use Ubuntu 20.04 as its Linux distribution. Visual Studio Code was used as the
primary code editor. All source code was checked in to open-source website Github. The
Github repository was configured to use a continuous integration pipeline using CircleCI,
allowing for automated unit testing after each new code push.
Python 3 was selected as the programming language for the attack tool. Python has
one of the largest ecosystems of libraries available for projects related to data science,
machine learning, and deep learning. Two of the most popular machine learning libraries used
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by the research community are PyTorch and Tensorflow, with PyTorch emerging in recent
years as the clear favorite.
Due to the extreme computational cost associated with training a new MalConv
model, which tends to require dataset sizes in the millions, an open-source model with pretrained weights was selected. A model trained using the EMBER dataset was selected for use
with this project, created by Anderson & Roth (2018). The pre-trained model is available as a
Keras HDF5 file. Instead of applying extra effort to convert this model to something usable
by PyTorch, Keras and TF2 were selected for use with this project. Adversarial attack library
CleverHans provides support for both PyTorch and Tensorflow, making both frameworks a
suitable choice. CleverHans includes many attack algorithms, to include the Fast Gradient
Sign Method (Papernot et al., 2016).
Reproducibility of results is important, especially given the differing success levels
amongst other research projects investigating attacks against MalConv. Given the selection of
Python 3, the use of Anaconda, virtual environments, and a requirements.txt file was used to
ensure dependencies are consistent across installations. A Docker image is also provided to
allow for maximum portability of the tool and ease of use across different base operating
systems.
The Library to Instrument Executable Formats (LIEF) is another Python library
selected for use with this research project for its ability to instrument binary executable files,
to include the Windows PE file format. Adversarial attacks against Windows PE files call for
binary modifications to take place while still preserving program functionality. To that end, a
stable and trustworthy library is preferred over manual modifications which may be more
susceptible to error.
Implementation of the pre-detection mechanism calls for use of a relational database.
Additionally, when running large experiments in bulk, databasing the results provides an easy
way to query for specific results afterwards. This proved to be much more helpful than sifting
through large log files produced by command line interface (CLI) output from the attack tool.
PostgreSQL was selected over alternatives such as MySQL simply due to familiarity of the
author. The psycopg2 was used as a database adapter to allow for connectivity between the
Python program and the PostgreSQL database.
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Running experiments against larger datasets are computationally expensive to
complete, as will be discussed in more detail later in the chapter, with some experiments
taking several days to run. Experimental results provided in the following chapter will be
computed using an Intel i7-8750H CPU, containing 6 cores at 2.20 GHz.

Artifact Design: Overview
An initial goal for the attack tool was to implement the append-based FGSM attack
originally described by Kreuk et al. (2018). Only after the original attack was implemented
could potential improvements be included and then evaluated. The attack tool is a simple CLI
utility written in Python. The tool will be used to support experiments in the next chapter of
this dissertation and therefore includes highly customizable command line arguments and the
ability to support bulk processing of large datasets.
The only required command line argument for the attack tool is the location of a single
executable or directory containing multiple executables. Running the attack tool with the -h
or --help options will display usage instructions describing each of the program arguments.
Optional arguments include the ability to customize the output directory, adjust logging
verbosity, altering the payload size, allowing existing output executables to be overwritten,
changing the payload initialization method, saving experiment results to a database, or to
invert behavior by using benign input files.
Type 2 errors are of the most interest to an attacker, where they seek to modify a
malicious executable such that a machine learning model classifies it as benign. For the
purposes of early development on the attack tool, it was easier to work with benign
executables, allowing for continued use of an anti-virus product in the development
environment. An observation rarely mentioned in the research literature is that most of the
proposed attacks can work in either direction, allowing benign executables to be misclassified
as being malicious while remaining completely safe to run. Malicious executables were tested
later in the development process. The command line flags -b or --benign are therefore used
to tell the tool the input files are benign, and the targeted output classification should be
malicious.
An input file or directory is a required argument. For ease of use, the tool does not
require the user to specify which is being supplied. The tool will automatically determine if
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the argument is a valid file, valid directory, or an invalid input. In the case of a file, validation
is also performed to ensure the supplied file is in Windows PE file format. Early in the
development of the tool, a simple check for the “MZ” magic bytes was performed. The
current version of the tool now uses LIEF to determine if the file is valid. When a directory is
supplied as input, the tool will fetch the list of files within the directory and loop through
them to identify valid PE files. This functionality allows for bulk processing of executables.
The optional argument for output directory is validated by ensuring the path exists, the
path is a directory, and the user has permission to write files within the directory. If an output
directory is not specified by the user, modified executables will be saved to the
“samples/output” directory.

Artifact Design: Model Implementation
To determine success for a given attack, the tool must have the ability to run samples
through the complete pre-trained MalConv model. A natural flow for the program consists of:
•

Running the original sample through the model.

•

Recording the prediction for the original sample.

•

Running an attack to modify the original sample.

•

Running the modified sample through the model.

•

Recording the prediction for the modified sample.

•

Comparing results and determining if evasion has been achieved.

Adding the ability to run samples through MalConv was therefore the next step taken
in development of the attack tool. White-box attacks will need the ability to compute
gradients, also requiring the model to be present first.
As previously mentioned, this study will use the EMBER-trained MalConv model
created by Anderson & Roth (2018). The HDF5 file was downloaded from the EMBER
Github repository. Keras code used to define the model’s architecture was therefore adapted
from code within this repository as well. Code defining the MalConv architecture can be seen
in Figure 19.
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Figure 19. Keras code defining MalConv, adapted from Anderson & Roth (2018).

This code would not remain intact for long, as the next section of this chapter calls for
breaking this model apart to assist with the attack code. With the attack tool now parsing input
files and the malware classifier defined, it was then possible to begin running executable files
through the tool to determine their maliciousness. This capability was initially tested using a
small benign dataset gathered from the Windows development machine itself, and through a
small set of malicious executables downloaded from VirusTotal.
Samples smaller than the 1 MB input size used by the EMBER-trained MalConv
model were padded using a special character. The EMBER-trained MalConv model uses a
value 256 for its special padding character (Anderson & Roth, 2018). This is different than the
padding value of 0 specified within an appendix diagram for the original MalConv proposal
by Raff et al. (2018a). It was deemed important to use the same convention that the model
was trained with. Samples larger than the 1 MB input size were truncated, allowing them to
be used with the smaller input size. These executables are not targetable by the attack tool
when using an append-based strategy to add a file overlay. This limitation is well documented
within the research literature.
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Artifact Design: Implementation of Append-Based FGSM Attack
After adding the ability to classify samples using the attack tool, the next step was to
implement the append-based FGSM attack proposed by Kreuk et al., (2018). A primary
challenge when attacking MalConv is overcoming the non-differentiable embedding layer.
Most gradient-based attacks within the research literature solve this problem by first
generating an embedded representation of the input bytes. The Keras layers shown in Figure
19 were therefore broken up into two separate components. The first component takes raw
bytes as input, normalizes their size to 1 MB as described in the previous section, and then
runs them through the initial embedding layer. The second component uses the embedded 8dimentional vectors as input and is responsible for running them through the rest of the
model. The second component is fully differentiable and can therefore be used to collect
gradient information required by the attack code. A key observation is that chaining the two
new smaller models together yields equivalent results to running the complete model by itself.
The attack code begins by initiating a user-specified payload size using bytes
generated uniformly at random. The payload is appended to the end of the input file. The
bytes are then run through the embedding layer only to create an embedded 8-dimential
representation of each byte.
An iterative process then begins by first running the CleverHans implementation of
FGSM against the embedded bytes. This iterative process is an implementation of the while
loop originally shown in Figure 16. The algorithm appears to call for the perturbed embedded
bytes to be subtracted from the original embedded payload only. In practice this appeared to
cause a length mismatch error. To overcome this challenge, the perturbation was instead
subtracted from the full embedded representation instead of the payload only. After the
subtraction is complete, bytes from the payload are extracted and appended to the original
embedded representation. This approach ensures that only the payload bytes are ever
perturbed. A working implementation of the attack loop is shown in Figure 20.
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Figure 20. A Python implementation of the append-based FGSM attack.

There are two more subtle differences in which the attack tool implementation differs
from the original algorithm shown in Figure 16. The attack tool implementation appears to
add the signed gradient instead of subtracting it. This is misleading though, as setting the
“targeted” argument to true in the FGSM function call results in CleverHans inverting the loss
internally by adding a negative sign to it. Therefore, loss will still be minimized with respect
to the target label. The other notable difference from the attack proposed by Kreuk et al.
(2018) is the addition of clipping, notably absence in Figure 16. This appeared to provide
more consistent results, clipping the embedded bytes to fit within the valid range of values
before proceeding to the next iteration. The use of clipping is suggested in the original
proposal for an iterative FGSM, commonly referred to as BIM (Kurakin et al., 2016).
The loop will end when the embedded bytes successfully achieve high evasion rates of
99% or greater when ran against the partial MalConv model defined earlier. In most cases this
happens quickly, but a maximum iteration count was added for protection against an infinite
loop, which does occur when samples are unable to achieve high evasion rates.
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The final piece of the attack is mapping backwards across the non-differentiable
embedding layer. In other words, a collection of 8-dimensional vectors now exists for which
evasion can be achieved. To produce a working executable, each 8-dimentional vector needs
to be converted into a byte within the range 0-255. The original attack by Kreuk et al. (2018)
explains a method for mapping each embedding to its nearest neighbor within MalConv’s
embedding matrix. Suciu et al. (2019) use an L2 distance metric to achieve this. The Python
code used to convert a single 8-D embedding into a byte can be seen in Figure 21.

Figure 21. Python function used to find the closest byte to an 8D-embedding.

To convert the entire payload from embedding space to input space involves a loop
over each of the payload bytes. This is sometimes referred to as the reconstruction phase.
While the original proposal in Figure 16 suggests performing this step for all input bytes
within the file, mapping backwards through the embedding layer appears to be a clear
bottleneck in the performance, with the attack tool from this paper spending over 99% of its
time there. This dissertation observes that this step is only necessary to perform using the
payload bytes instead of the full file. The original content needs to remain intact to preserve
functionality, making it possible to simply copy them from the original input file. Only the
embedded payload must be mapped back to input space. The reconstruction phase can also be
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parallelized to improve the runtime of the attack quite substantially. The attack tool uses
Python’s Joblib library to implement the parallelism. It uses the tqdm library to display a
progress bar for this long-running portion of the attack.
The reconstruction phase often leads to a drop in accuracy. When 8-dimentional
vectors of floating-point numbers are converted to single integers within the range 0-255, it’s
only natural that multiple vectors would end up mapping to the exact same byte value. These
collisions will result in a natural loss in precision, as 20 vectors that were once very different
from one another may end up having the same byte value as one another in the final payload.
Multiple hobbyist implementations of this attack on Github make the mistake of using
the MalConv prediction from inside the attack loop to declare that evasion has been
successfully achieved. After mapping backwards through the embedding layer, the final
perturbed binary must be run back through the full model before declaring the attack was
successful in evading MalConv. Capturing any loss in precision from the reconstruction phase
is vital to ensuring results are accurate.
The results produced from running this baseline attack against a large dataset are
presented in chapter 4.

Artifact Design: Payload Initialization Techniques
In addition to the randomized payload initialization technique proposed by Kreuk et al.
(2018) and Kolosnjaji et al. (2018), this research also adds a pseudorandom initialization
method to the attack tool to allow for consistent results, allowing successive runs of the attack
tool to produce identical perturbed binaries if desired by the user. After implementing the
pseudorandom technique, the command line arguments -i or --initialization-method
were added to allow users to overwrite the default behavior and pave the way for
experimental payload initialization techniques to be added. The pseudorandom technique was
added for convenience and is not expected to offer an improvement to the attack. A source
code file to hold all payload initialization functions was also added for organizational
purposes.
With the attack tool now supporting multiple payload initialization strategies, it was
easy to begin adding new techniques to determine if any of them offered a clear improvement
over the randomized method. Implementing techniques that called for the same byte to be
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used throughout the entire payload were trivial. Outlier bytes were obvious candidates to try,
such as 0 and 255. Other cases such as the midpoint and the padding byte were attempted for
completeness. These simple initialization strategies can be seen in Figure 22.

Figure 22. Implementation of simple payload initialization strategies.

More complex payload initialization strategies were also attempted. Of high interest is
the weighted initialization strategy, as described earlier in the chapter. This strategy seeks to
use the byte distributions from successful payloads as a starting point for future attacks. For
example, 0x8B was amongst the bytes that appeared most frequently within payloads that
allowed a malicious binary to appear benign. The idea behind the weighted initialization
strategy is to use the 0x8B byte at similar rates as it appeared within the payloads of
successful attacks, using it as a starting point before running the gradient attack.
To implement the weighted initialization strategy, the attack tool makes use of
Python’s random.choices() function. When supplied with a weights parameter, it allows
certain values to be chosen at higher frequencies than others. The full implementation of this
initialization strategy can be seen in Figure 23.

58

Figure 23. Implementation of the weighted payload initialization strategy.

To obtain the distributions used by the weighted initialization strategy, 1,000 samples
were selected at random and ran through the attack tool using the current randomized
initialization strategy. The payloads of each successful attack were saved and then the counts
for each byte were tallied. In creating these distribution vectors, care was taken to select
different samples than the ones being used for the experiments whose results are reported in
chapter 4.

Artifact Design: Defeating the Pre-Detection Mechanism
Chen et al. (2019) proposed a pre-detection mechanism to reject adversarial examples
before entering the classifier. The pre-detection mechanism works by computing a hash of
both the PE code section and the full file (Chen et al., 2019). When the pre-detection
mechanism observes a new sample whose code section is identical to a previous malicious
sample but whose full file hash is different, the conclusion can be drawn that the new sample
has likely been tampered with and can therefore be immediately rejected as being an
adversarial example (Chen et al., 2019). The authors report a 100% success rate but allude to
the possibility of code section attacks in future research (Chen et al., 2019).
While Chen et al. (2019) acknowledge that their proposed defense would likely not
work against future adversarial attacks that target the code section, complex fine-grained
transformations of the code section appear unnecessary to achieve evasion. This dissertation
proposes the use of a single byte attack to be carried out against the code section. This is
enough to produce a completely different hash of that section. No attempt will be made to
move the adversarial payload into the code section. The adversarial bytes will continue to be
placed in an area of the PE file that is easier to manipulate, such as the overlay or slack space.
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Chen et al. (2019) note that their pre-detection mechanism offers a performance
increase when at least 0.26% of new inputs result in a successful database lookup. This occurs
because the database lookup is significantly faster than running a new sample through the
MalConv model. While the performance increase appears desirable, this likely means the predetection mechanism is vulnerable to a timing attack whereby attackers can determine if their
sample has been rejected by the pre-detection mechanism or the MalConv model itself. This
provides context for where an attacker should focus their attention in subsequent attacks.
It’s often the case that extra space is present at the end of each section, often referred
to as slack space. Existing code will not make jumps or calls into this section, making it safe
to use without disrupting file functionality. The original proposal for the pre-detection
mechanism by Chen et al. (2019) doesn’t specify if the section hash is to be computed on the
code section’s content only or if the hash should be taken across the entire section, to include
slack space. This dissertation assumes that a valid attack should address both scenarios.
Addressing this challenge amounts to modifying header fields such as VirtualSize so that
defenders are unable to differentiate between the original code section instructions and the
maliciously appended content.
Previous research has demonstrated that adversarial payloads can also be placed
within slack space (Suciu et al., 2019). When specifically applied to the code section’s slack
space, this should result in the hash of the code section changing, provided header values are
also updated. Slack-space attacks should therefore defeat the pre-detection mechanism.
Attacks utilizing the file overlay are naturally able to achieve higher success rates though, as
more bytes can typically be placed here (Suciu et al., 2019).
This dissertation therefore continues to place payloads in the file overlay with hopes of
achieving optimal success rates and uses only a single byte of slack space within the code
section to bypass the pre-detection mechanism. Using all remaining slack space to place an
adversarial payload may raise other red flags in a feature-based detection pipeline. All
existing slack attacks greedily choose to use all remaining space within a section.
To perform binary patching of the executable and implement the single-byte attack,
the attack tool will make use LIEF. The algorithm begins by locating the code section,
signified by the .text naming convention. The algorithm proceeds by determining if slack
space exists by checking to see if a difference exists with respect to the SizeOfRawData and
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VirtualSize

fields. If present, the algorithm will conclude by appending a single byte. For

demonstration purposes and ease of implementation, the byte 0x01 is appended. In practice it
would be advisable to use a random value to prevent defenders from explicitly checking for
the byte value 0x01. The full algorithm as implemented in Python can be seen in Figure 24.

Figure 24. Binary patching code used to defeat the pre-detection mechanism.

The artifact was then tested against small subsets of the test datasets to ensure the predetection attack was implemented correctly. The resulting binaries were manually analyzed to
ensure the LIEF library was patching executables as intended. The expected result was a very
minimal set of changes, to include a single additional byte within the code section’s slack
space and adjustments to headers that increase the size of the code section.
In nearly all cases the expected result was validated. A select few binaries showed
large numbers of modified bytes though. An investigation revealed that LIEF automatically
fills slack space with 0x00 byte values, even if the original content used other values. The
Windows PE file format should indeed use a 0x00 value within slack space (Goppit, 2006).
Despite testing with benign binaries from trustworthy sources, analysis revealed this was not
always the case. For example, a Firefox binary had its code section’s slack space filled with
0xCC values. This 0xCC value represents a software breakpoint and will therefore halt code
execution. LIEF replaced all 0xCC bytes in this executable’s slack space with 0x00 bytes
upon re-writing the binary. This unexpected finding appeared to have no impact on the
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success of the pre-detection evasion attack but is documented for the benefit of those wishing
the minimize the number of changes that occur to the target binary.
Attacks were then re-run against a subset of the testing dataset to verify that the new
changes work as intended. The malicious dataset returned modest results, with only 60.82%
of samples evading pre-detection. The results significantly underperformed expectations,
leading to an investigation to determine the cause of failure cases. The investigation
concluded that several binaries did not have a .text section, preventing binary patching from
occurring. Manual analysis of a few binaries exhibiting this behavior revealed obfuscation
using various packing tools. For example, several executables had a base code section of UPX1
instead of .text. This likely means the executable was packed using UPX, a free executable
packer that offers high compression ratios and fast decompression rates.
Re-examining the proposal for the pre-detection mechanism revealed the authors
calling for hashing of the executable section and not the .text section specifically (Chen et
al., 2019). The attack implementation was therefore modified to dynamically determine the
section containing the beginning of the executable’s code instead of assuming this section will
always be named .text. Dynamic resolution was achieved by following the BaseOfCode or
AddressofEntryPoint

fields within the Windows PE header. The RVA provided by these

fields can be supplied to LIEF’s section_from_rva function to determine the code section.
Using the BaseOfCode field did not always result in a successful lookup. In those instances,
AddressOfEntryPoint

was used as a fallback value. An implementation of the fallback

method can be seen in Figure 25.

Figure 25. Using LIEF to dynamically determine the code section.
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Direct modifications to the code section using semantically equivalent instructions
were briefly explored. The disassembly framework Capstone was used to disassemble
instructions from the code section. Linearly processing of disassembled instructions appeared
problematic, as only the first handful of instructions appeared valid in some instances. The
valid instructions often corresponded to a start section, as shown via IDA Pro in Figure 26.
Full implementation of this feature would likely entail “stepping into” calls and jumps. A
more thorough validation strategy would also be required to ensure program behavior remains
intact. Modifying instructions remains a promising research direction for future work.

Figure 26. IDA Pro view of the valid instructions captured by Capstone.

Artifact Design: CLI Output
An example demonstrating usage of the attack tool and its corresponding output will
now be provided. For demonstration purposes, a single malicious executable will be perturbed
using a 1,500-byte payload, random payload initialization strategy, and L2 distance metric
reconstruction method. The attack tool arguments in that scenario may look like:
python3 attack.py -p 1500 -i random --l2norm -f
samples/malicious/sorel20m/
/001a968283c67e39be9e4d6c41892bfdb9953dbce8fa8773dc33f368fd7d7ab2

The tool begins by collecting the original file hash and code section hash to determine
if the pre-detection mechanism would be evaded. The original maliciousness score
determined by MalConv is also provided to the user. In this case, MalConv correctly predicts
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the sample is malicious with 100% confidence. In the attack phase, bytes are run through the
embedding layer and then iteratively perturbed using FGSM. The maximum number of
iterations it configurable, but the attack is designed to stop when MalConv reaches a
maliciousness score close to 0. After the embedded bytes are perturbed, the reconstruction
stage begins. A progress bar was implemented to provide the user with feedback regarding the
reconstruction status. These features can all be seen in Figure 27.

Figure 27. Output of the attack tool during the reconstruction phase.

After completion of the reconstruction phase, hashes of the final payload are computed
for comparison purposes. The single-byte code section attack is then attempted in hopes of
evading the pre-detection mechanism. Results are then printed to the screen, including the
MalConv score of the final perturbed payload. Scores below the 50% threshold are considered
to have achieved evasion. Hashes of the final file and code section are also calculated to
determine if the pre-detection mechanism would be evaded. Output printed after the
reconstruction phase can be seen in Figure 28.

Figure 28. Output of the attack tool, post-reconstruction.
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In the provided example, an executable with a maliciousness score of 100% was
perturbed to achieve evasion, with MalConv assigning the modified executable a
maliciousness score of 0%. The attack tool will then output cumulative statistics necessary for
interpreting results when using the bulk-processing feature is used, to include the percentage
of samples able to evade detection by MalConv.

Dataset Selection
This section describes the dataset collection methodology to be used throughout the
remainder of this dissertation. Due to significant flaws in the methodology used by multiple
related papers, a review of existing datasets and their associated shortcomings will first be
provided.
Raff et al. (2018b) report heavy bias and overfitting when using datasets containing
only a few thousand samples, explaining that they’re not large enough to provide good
representation of the full population of executables. Gathering Windows PE files from
Microsoft Windows is a common method to obtain benign samples, but the authors explain
that they lead to strong bias, where models learn to identify Microsoft compiled executables
instead of generalizing to identify any benign file. Likewise, malware sharing websites such
as Virus Share tend to contain samples provided by volunteers and human analysts, making
them biased towards specific types of malware families (Raff et al., 2018b).
In one of the first adversarial attacks demonstrated against MalConv, Kolosnjaji et al.
(2018) produced a small dataset containing 9,195 malicious binaries and 4,000 benign
binaries. The malicious files were collected from VirusShare, Citadel, and APT1. The benign
files were downloaded at random from popular search engines. Suciu et al. (2019) were
unable to reproduce the results of the research reported by Kolosnjaji et al. (2018), and
therefore attempted to re-create a dataset of similar size and distribution to see if the results
were merely artifacts of the dataset’s properties. They concluded that the dataset suffered
from severe overfitting and poor generalizability.
As a result of this finding, Suciu et al. (2019) opted to use a dataset consisting of 16.3
million binaries, which was derived from an even larger dataset of 33 million binaries,
collected from VirusTotal, Reversing Labs, and proprietary FireEye data. Stratified sampling
was performed to limit the inclusion of overrepresented malware families. They later ran each
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experiment using this dataset, the EMBER dataset, and the small overfitted dataset modeled
after work performed by Kolosnjaji et al. (2018).
Chen et al. (2019) created a small dataset containing 5,200 malicious binaries and
5,150 benign binaries. The malicious files were collected from VirusShare, DAS, and
malwarebenchmark, whereas the benign files were collected from various Microsoft Windows
installations and supplemented with executables from 30 additional software companies.
Kreuk et al. (2018) used a very similar methodology, collecting 7,150 benign executables
from a fresh Windows 8.1 installation and using “ninite” to supplement that with executables
from over 50 other software vendors. They used 10,866 malicious executables from the
Microsoft Kaggle 2015 dataset. Due to the small dataset sizes and similar collection
methodologies used in other failed experiments, it seems likely that datasets used by both
Chen et al. (2019) and Kreuk et al. (2018) suffer from overfitting issues as well.
Due to the numerous issues with malware dataset collection in related research, this
dissertation will attempt to draw samples from large datasets, where PE files are collected in
the millions instead of thousands. Effort will be made to ensure that the samples are
representative of the entire population of PE files and not biased towards a particular software
vendor or malware family.
Due to compute restrictions and a short timeline for project completion, the EMBERtrained MalConv model will be used. The EMBER dataset contains more than one million
Windows PE files (Anderson & Roth, 2018). The training phase is when it becomes most
necessary to use large datasets to ensure the model can generalize well. Running samples
through the resulting model for experimental purposes likely doesn’t require millions of
samples to be used, but the samples should at least be representative of the entire population
of Windows PE files. By drawing uniformly at random from a dataset with millions of
Windows PE files, it’s unlikely for the experiment to be biased towards a particular type or
family of malware.
One challenge for this project was the lack of publicly available datasets of the
extreme sizes necessary to prevent bias and overfitting with this problem set. The EMBER
dataset is frequently cited within the research literature, but samples shouldn’t be drawn from
the same set of binaries that the model was trained with. Additionally, the EMBER dataset
doesn’t make the actual binaries public, instead opting to release feature data (Anderson &
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Roth, 2018). The dataset of 2 million binaries used by Raff et al. (2018a) does not appear to
be publicly available, nor does the dataset of 12.5 million binaries used by Suciu et al. (2019).
In both cases it appears likely that the research teams partnered with an antivirus vendor or
security company.
The Sophos AI team later released a production-scale dataset called SOREL-20M,
consisting of with over 20 million Windows PE files (Harang & Rudd, 2020). The SOREL20M dataset contains over 10 million malicious executables made available via an AWS S3
bucket. Sophos disarmed all malware samples by altering the header flags such that the
OptionalHeader.Subsystem

flag and FileHeader.Machine flag are both set to 0. Each of

the samples were then compressed using zlib before being uploaded to the S3 bucket.
Results reported in the following chapter are the result of experiments whose inputs
were drawn uniformly at random from the complete pool of malicious Windows PE files from
the SOREL-20M dataset. The samples all need to be uncompressed and rearmed to arrive at
their original state. Leaving the binaries in a disarmed state did not appear to have a
noticeable effect on results and were only re-armed for completeness and to ensure full
accuracy of each experiment. Downloaded samples were immediately piped into the zlib-flate
utility to decompress the samples.

Limitations and Assumptions
The authors of the original MalConv architecture proposed a model that allowed for
executable files up to 2MB in length, using a batch size of 256 (Raff et al., 2018a). The
authors of the EMBER dataset opted to use 1MB file sizes and batch sizes of 100 to fit within
the resource limits of two Titan X (Pascal) GPUs (Anderson & Roth, 2018). To err on the side
of caution, the attack artifact designed for this dissertation will assume similar constraints on
memory and compute resources exist. An assumption is that the offensive and defensive
techniques described in this dissertation would apply equally to the original MalConv model
as well.
The primary limitation to the append-based FGSM attack is its inability to work on
binaries greater than 1MB in size, the maximum input size allowed by the EMBER-trained
MalConv model. Previous research has demonstrated that slack space attacks may be
successful in filling this gap (Suciu et al., 2019).
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Expected Contributions
Machine learning models have demonstrated incredible potential as compared to
traditional antivirus products, especially in their ability to generalize and detect previously
unseen variants of malware. One of their greatest flaws, however, is their susceptibility to
attack via adversarial examples. Featureless raw-byte classifiers such as MalConv largely
eliminate the need for domain expertise but are still vulnerable to adversarial attacks.
Protecting machine learning models from adversarial examples is essential if classification
models are to be used within production environments. A key motivation behind this
offensive-oriented dissertation is to demonstrate the ease at which adversarial attacks can be
employed, helping to eliminate the perception that the attacks are merely theoretical in nature.
Although detection models used within antivirus products would largely be considered
black-box attack scenarios, the white-box attack algorithms presented within this dissertation
are still quite practical. Yuan, et al. (2019) explain a common technique for attackers is to
attack a white-box model trained with similar data and attempt to transfer the adversarial
example to the black-box environment. Chakroborty et al. (2018) further explain that blackbox environments can be repeatedly queried to gather input-output tuples, which can in-turn
be used to train a surrogate model allowing for use of white-box attacks.
Specific contributions to the research literature include the release of an open-source
attack tool, new payload initialization methods to select from, a payload size minimization
algorithm, a near-instantaneous byte reconstruction phase, and the ability to bypass predetection mechanisms that may be included as part of a larger detection pipeline. The defeat
of the pre-detection mechanism demonstrates how easily attacks can be chained together as a
means of bypassing multiple detection capabilities. The significance of attacking this predetection mechanism is that many prior studies are focused exclusively on attacks against the
model itself. Recent job postings suggest that companies are now hiring security architects
and penetration testers to secure their AI/ML technologies, with scopes extending well
beyond the machine learning model itself, to include MLOps pipelines and supporting
infrastructure.
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Summary
This chapter explained the research methodology that will be used for the remainder of
this dissertation. A design science methodology was chosen with the goal of designing a
viable solution to a relevant problem in the field. The contributions presented in this research
will improve adversarial attacks against machine learning models and their associated preprocessing pipelines. An artifact was designed and fully implemented. The artifact will be
used for experiments in the next chapter, where a large dataset will be used to compare
treatment results. The expectation is that a statistically discernable difference exists when
compared to previous attacks.
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CHAPTER 4
RESULTS
After implementing the attack artifact described in chapter three, experiments were
then conducted to determine its level of success in attacks against MalConv. The results assist
in answering the original research questions outlined in chapter one. Results are presented in
five distinct phases. The first phase runs the attack artifact using the new byte initialization
techniques described in chapter three to determine which methods yield the highest evasion
rates. The second phase analyzes speed improvements to the byte reconstruction phase after
implementation of K-D tree queries and then verifies correctness of its results. The third phase
attempts to defeat the pre-detection mechanism using a single byte attack to the code section.
The fourth phase attempts to find the minimal payload size possible without making sacrifices
to evasion rate, making use of the new payload size minimization algorithm proposed in the
previous chapter. The final phase compares the new attack tool to other open-source libraries
and results provided within the research literature.

Payload Initialization Strategies
The weighted payload initialization strategy is derived from the byte distribution
counts of successful payloads, as described in the previous chapter. The byte distributions
were gathered by selecting 1,000 samples at random from the SOREL-20M dataset. This
dataset was not used for any other purpose, with validation of payload initialization strategies
being performed using a different subset of samples. An attack was run against all 1,000
samples using the random payload initialization strategy. Perturbed samples that successfully
evaded MalConv were then analyzed, appending the byte distribution counts of their payload
to a global data structure containing cumulative counts. The most frequently occurring bytes
were 0x00 (0), 0x3F (63), 0x68 (104), and 0x8B (139).
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A new dataset of 500 new samples was produced by again selecting samples
uniformly at random from the SOREL-20M dataset. The samples were then run through the
attack tool for each of the proposed payload initialization techniques while using 1,000-byte
payloads. The random initialization strategy is used by existing attacks within the research
literature and serves as a baseline to compare new strategies against. With the constant byte
value strategies, the entire payload is filled with the same byte. The separate experiment is run
for all 256 possible byte values. Table 1 shows the resulting evasion percentages and the postreconstruction MalConv scores.

Table 1. A comparison of payload initialization strategies.
MalConv Maliciousness Score (Post-Reconstruction)

Initialization Strategy

Evasion

Avg

Std

Med

Min

Max

Random (Original)

53.27

48.51

94.43

0.00

100.00

46.40

Weighted

29.42

44.03

0.01

0.00

100.00

71.20

Byte 0x00 (0)

42.75

48.52

0.14

0.00

100.00

57.00

Byte 0x01 (1)

43.21

49.29

0.09

0.00

100.00

56.80

Byte 0x02 (2)

61.16

47.64

99.99

0.00

100.00

39.40

Byte 0x03 (3)

15.03

35.38

0.00

0.00

100.00

85.00

Byte 0x04 (4)

66.78

45.53

99.99

0.00

100.00

33.20

Byte 0x05 (5)

77.69

39.63 100.00

0.00

100.00

22.00

Byte 0x06 (6)

46.53

49.60

0.01

0.00

100.00

53.60

Byte 0x07 (7)

21.66

41.11

0.00

0.00

100.00

78.20

Byte 0x08 (8)

15.33

32.99

0.03

0.00

100.00

86.40

Byte 0x09 (9)

48.66

49.24

8.77

0.00

100.00

50.80

Byte 0x0A (10)

38.71

48.52

0.00

0.00

100.00

61.00

Byte 0x0B (11)

36.48

47.92

0.00

0.00

100.00

63.80

Byte 0x0C (12)

10.48

29.08

0.00

0.00

100.00

89.80

Byte 0x0D (13)

75.64

40.98 100.00

0.00

100.00

24.60

Byte 0x0E (14)

53.16

48.29

89.29

0.00

100.00

46.80

Byte 0x0F (15)

37.66

48.15

0.11

0.00

100.00

62.60

Rate
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Byte 0x10 (16)

23.40

42.38

0.00

0.00

100.00

76.60

Byte 0x11 (17)

42.75

49.47

0.00

0.00

100.00

57.20

Byte 0x12 (18)

15.19

35.01

0.00

0.00

100.00

85.20

Byte 0x13 (19)

11.63

31.90

0.00

0.00

100.00

88.20

Byte 0x14 (20)

5.80

22.12

0.00

0.00

100.00

94.60

Byte 0x15 (21)

0.92

7.18

0.00

0.00

100.00

99.20

Byte 0x16 (22)

16.13

36.19

0.00

0.00

100.00

84.20

Byte 0x17 (23)

15.67

35.84

0.00

0.00

100.00

84.40

Byte 0x18 (24)

68.27

45.26 100.00

0.00

100.00

31.60

Byte 0x19 (25)

36.70

47.65

0.00

0.00

100.00

63.20

Byte 0x1A (26)

32.92

45.93

0.00

0.00

100.00

67.00

Byte 0x1B (27)

55.07

48.75 100.00

0.00

100.00

45.40

Byte 0x1C (28)

33.55

44.64

0.31

0.00

100.00

66.40

Byte 0x1D (29)

30.02

43.75

0.33

0.00

100.00

71.00

Byte 0x1E (30)

60.36

46.05

95.36

0.00

100.00

39.20

Byte 0x1F (31)

55.06

47.97

92.65

0.00

100.00

45.50

Byte 0x20 (32)

26.54

43.18

0.00

0.00

100.00

73.00

Byte 0x21 (33)

55.79

49.44 100.00

0.00

100.00

44.00

Byte 0x22 (34)

59.89

48.73 100.00

0.00

100.00

40.40

Byte 0x23 (35)

74.11

41.12 100.00

0.00

100.00

25.80

Byte 0x24 (36)

70.37

45.59 100.00

0.00

100.00

29.80

Byte 0x25 (37)

64.76

46.66

99.98

0.00

100.00

35.20

Byte 0x26 (38)

48.00

49.27

10.06

0.00

100.00

52.40

Byte 0x27 (39)

59.22

47.35

99.95

0.00

100.00

41.80

Byte 0x28 (40)

53.75

49.50

99.99

0.00

100.00

46.20

Byte 0x29 (41)

61.34

48.47 100.00

0.00

100.00

38.60

Byte 0x2A (42)

48.77

49.20

18.79

0.00

100.00

51.40

Byte 0x2B (43)

31.81

46.61

0.00

0.00

100.00

68.20

Byte 0x2C (44)

24.69

42.79

0.00

0.00

100.00

75.60

Byte 0x2D (45)

69.50

45.62 100.00

0.00

100.00

30.60
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Byte 0x2E (46)

40.30

48.15

0.00

0.00

100.00

59.60

Byte 0x2F (47)

18.24

37.07

0.00

0.00

100.00

81.40

Byte 0x30 (48)

54.11

47.64

87.48

0.00

100.00

46.00

Byte 0x31 (49)

38.68

48.29

0.00

0.00

100.00

61.60

Byte 0x32 (50)

63.27

47.54 100.00

0.00

100.00

36.80

Byte 0x33 (51)

55.57

49.12 100.00

0.00

100.00

44.80

Byte 0x34 (52)

70.82

45.49 100.00

0.00

100.00

29.20

Byte 0x35 (53)

18.23

38.32

0.00

0.00

100.00

81.80

Byte 0x36 (54)

65.95

47.28 100.00

0.00

100.00

34.20

Byte 0x37 (55)

54.40

48.08

94.12

0.00

100.00

45.00

Byte 0x38 (56)

50.40

49.19

75.10

0.00

100.00

49.60

Byte 0x39 (57)

70.12

44.25 100.00

0.00

100.00

30.00

Byte 0x3A (58)

68.00

46.53 100.00

0.00

100.00

32.00

Byte 0x3B (59)

58.02

48.10

99.99

0.00

100.00

42.20

Byte 0x3C (60)

51.09

48.46

57.67

0.00

100.00

49.20

Byte 0x3D (61)

45.27

46.91

19.36

0.00

100.00

55.00

Byte 0x3E (62)

64.63

46.27 100.00

0.00

100.00

35.60

Byte 0x3F (63)

29.01

44.56

0.00

0.00

100.00

70.60

Byte 0x40 (64)

10.20

30.30

0.00

0.00

100.00

89.80

Byte 0x41 (65)

57.23

49.50 100.00

0.00

100.00

42.80

Byte 0x42 (66)

69.01

45.21 100.00

0.00

100.00

30.80

Byte 0x43 (67)

47.12

48.49

10.92

0.00

100.00

54.00

Byte 0x44 (68)

23.97

41.48

0.03

0.00

100.00

76.60

Byte 0x45 (69)

53.62

48.40 100.00

0.00

100.00

47.60

Byte 0x46 (70)

27.49

44.20

0.00

0.00

100.00

72.80

Byte 0x47 (71)

7.90

26.68

0.00

0.00

100.00

92.20

Byte 0x48 (72)

62.60

47.31 100.00

0.00

100.00

38.00

Byte 0x49 (73)

69.50

44.08

100.0

0.00

100.00

31.20

Byte 0x4A (74)

45.45

49.59

0.02

0.00

100.00

54.60

Byte 0x4B (75)

59.93

48.13 100.00

0.00

100.00

40.60
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Byte 0x4C (76)

11.33

30.43

0.00

0.00

100.00

89.20

Byte 0x4D (77)

69.47

44.48 100.00

0.00

100.00

30.60

Byte 0x4E (78)

60.71

47.78 100.00

0.00

100.00

39.60

Byte 0x4F (79)

2.68

13.93

0.00

0.00

100.00

97.80

Byte 0x50 (80)

77.67

39.64 100.00

0.00

100.00

21.80

Byte 0x51 (81)

21.67

40.97

0.00

0.00

100.00

78.40

Byte 0x52 (82)

36.46

48.13

0.00

0.00

100.00

63.60

Byte 0x53 (83)

3.80

19.13

0.00

0.00

100.00

96.20

Byte 0x54 (84)

42.77

48.59

0.00

0.00

100.00

57.00

Byte 0x55 (85)

61.24

47.59 100.00

0.00

100.00

38.40

Byte 0x56 (86)

57.40

49.50 100.00

0.00

100.00

42.60

Byte 0x57 (87)

16.77

36.55

0.00

0.00

100.00

82.60

Byte 0x58 (88)

6.82

24.28

0.00

0.00

100.00

93.00

Byte 0x59 (89)

45.06

49.48

0.32

0.00

100.00

55.20

Byte 0x5A (90)

23.03

41.79

0.00

0.00

100.00

76.80

Byte 0x5B (91)

15.20

35.70

0.00

0.00

100.00

85.00

Byte 0x5C (92)

54.23

49.55 100.00

0.00

100.00

45.80

Byte 0x5D (93)

41.34

49.12

0.00

0.00

100.00

58.60

Byte 0x5E (94)

69.61

46.01 100.00

0.00

100.00

30.40

Byte 0x5F (95)

10.42

29.96

0.00

0.00

100.00

90.00

Byte 0x60 (96)

34.65

45.72

0.29

0.00

100.00

65.80

Byte 0x61 (97)

48.40

50.02

0.01

0.00

100.00

51.60

Byte 0x62 (98)

59.82

48.49 100.00

0.00

100.00

40.40

Byte 0x63 (99)

57.60

48.71 100.00

0.00

100.00

43.40

Byte 0x64 (100)

28.78

44.75

0.00

0.00

100.00

70.80

Byte 0x65 (101)

70.84

45.08 100.00

0.00

100.00

29.40

Byte 0x66 (102)

26.12

43.19

0.00

0.00

100.00

73.60

Byte 0x67 (103)

57.81

48.28

99.98

0.00

100.00

42.00

Byte 0x68 (104)

65.60

47.55 100.00

0.00

100.00

34.40

Byte 0x69 (105)

27.40

44.64

0.00

100.00

72.60

0.00
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Byte 0x6A (106)

12.36

31.45

0.00

0.00

100.00

87.80

Byte 0x6B (107)

15.90

35.12

0.00

0.00

100.00

84.80

Byte 0x6C (108)

47.94

49.60

0.51

0.00

100.00

52.20

Byte 0x6D (109)

14.45

34.72

0.00

0.00

100.00

85.80

Byte 0x6E (110)

41.24

48.96

0.00

0.00

100.00

59.00

Byte 0x6F (111)

39.60

48.96

0.00

0.00

100.00

60.40

Byte 0x70 (112)

23.60

40.03

0.02

0.00

100.00

76.60

Byte 0x71 (113)

48.45

48.79

26.43

0.00

100.00

51.40

Byte 0x72 (114)

64.27

46.13

99.97

0.00

100.00

35.60

Byte 0x73 (115)

57.94

49.18 100.00

0.00

100.00

42.00

Byte 0x74 (116)

54.83

49.79 100.00

0.00

100.00

45.20

Byte 0x75 (117)

45.67

49.50

0.00

0.00

100.00

54.20

Byte 0x76 (118)

5.99

23.08

0.00

0.00

100.00

94.00

Byte 0x77 (119)

32.22

46.76

0.00

0.00

100.00

67.80

Byte 0x78 (120)

61.60

48.68 100.00

0.00

100.00

38.40

Byte 0x79 (121)

38.84

47.89

0.00

0.00

100.00

61.00

Byte 0x7A (122)

35.00

47.74

0.00

0.00

100.00

65.00

Byte 0x7B (123)

36.40

47.97

0.00

0.00

100.00

63.80

Byte 0x7C (124)

16.83

37.41

0.00

0.00

100.00

83.20

Byte 0x7D (125)

13.12

32.99

0.00

0.00

100.00

87.40

Byte 0x7E (126)

13.51

33.58

0.00

0.00

100.00

86.60

Byte 0x7F (127)

36.75

47.54

0.00

0.00

100.00

63.60

Byte 0x80 (128)

9.22

28.79

0.00

0.00

100.00

90.80

Byte 0x81 (129)

66.53

46.67 100.00

0.00

100.00

33.60

Byte 0x82 (130)

21.27

39.81

0.00

0.00

100.00

79.40

Byte 0x83 (131)

13.95

34.47

0.00

0.00

100.00

86.00

Byte 0x84 (132)

2.17

14.32

0.00

0.00

100.00

97.80

Byte 0x85 (133)

23.40

42.38

0.00

0.00

100.00

76.70

Byte 0x86 (134)

33.29

46.56

0.00

0.00

100.00

66.80

Byte 0x87 (135)

37.99

47.71

0.00

0.00

100.00

61.60
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Byte 0x88 (136)

35.09

46.67

0.00

0.00

100.00

65.40

Byte 0x89 (137)

29.88

45.59

0.00

0.00

100.00

70.20

Byte 0x8A (138)

36.61

46.53

0.02

0.00

100.00

63.80

Byte 0x8B (139)

40.75

47.43

0.46

0.00

100.00

59.20

Byte 0x8C (140)

18.25

37.05

0.00

0.00

100.00

82.00

Byte 0x8D (141)

44.02

48.81

0.01

0.00

100.00

55.20

Byte 0x8E (142)

44.52

45.85

19.96

0.00

100.00

56.80

Byte 0x8F (143)

26.16

42.45

0.00

0.00

100.00

74.40

Byte 0x90 (144)

68.01

45.67 100.00

0.00

100.00

31.80

Byte 0x91 (145)

56.97

49.23 100.00

0.00

100.00

43.00

Byte 0x92 (146)

77.54

39.62 100.00

0.00

100.00

23.00

Byte 0x93 (147)

64.06

46.74 100.00

0.00

100.00

35.60

Byte 0x94 (148)

57.10

47.59

99.64

0.00

100.00

43.20

Byte 0x95 (149)

52.54

48.04

82.05

0.00

100.00

47.80

Byte 0x96 (150)

67.89

44.64 100.00

0.00

100.00

31.80

Byte 0x97 (151)

72.10

43.01 100.00

0.00

100.00

28.20

Byte 0x98 (152)

67.04

45.68 100.00

0.00

100.00

32.40

Byte 0x99 (153)

56.60

45.72

84.76

0.00

100.00

43.80

Byte 0x9A (154)

6.31

21.82

0.00

0.00

100.00

93.60

Byte 0x9B (155)

35.64

47.58

0.00

0.00

100.00

64.40

Byte 0x9C (156)

25.46

42.59

0.00

0.00

100.00

74.20

Byte 0x9D (157)

46.00

48.85

3.98

0.00

100.00

54.20

Byte 0x9E (158)

10.67

30.43

0.00

0.00

100.00

89.20

Byte 0x9F (159)

69.01

44.38 100.00

0.00

100.00

30.80

Byte 0xA0 (160)

7.37

23.61

0.00

0.00

100.00

94.00

Byte 0xA1 (161)

23.48

41.10

0.00

0.00

100.00

77.00

Byte 0xA2 (162)

15.94

35.85

0.00

0.00

100.00

83.40

Byte 0xA3 (163)

36.17

46.37

0.09

0.00

100.00

63.00

Byte 0xA4 (164)

12.68

31.08

0.00

0.00

100.00

88.40

Byte 0xA5 (165)

30.66

45.42

0.00

0.00

100.00

69.60
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Byte 0xA6 (166)

47.25

49.93

0.00

0.00

100.00

52.80

Byte 0xA7 (167)

51.82

47.72

72.52

0.00

100.00

48.20

Byte 0xA8 (168)

67.84

45.70 100.00

0.00

100.00

32.80

Byte 0xA9 (169)

56.43

49.20 100.00

0.00

100.00

43.80

Byte 0xAA (170)

1.79

12.25

0.00

0.00

100.00

98.40

Byte 0xAB (171)

3.65

18.28

0.00

0.00

100.00

96.60

Byte 0xAC (172)

14.48

34.88

0.00

0.00

100.00

85.60

Byte 0xAD (173)

22.84

41.50

0.00

0.00

100.00

77.60

Byte 0xAE (174)

48.12

48.41

20.94

0.00

100.00

52.00

Byte 0xAF (175)

28.90

43.24

0.02

0.00

100.00

72.00

Byte 0xB0 (176)

49.29

49.14

27.51

0.00

100.00

50.80

Byte 0xB1 (177)

51.62

49.87 100.00

0.00

100.00

48.40

Byte 0xB2 (178)

50.16

47.63

57.83

0.00

100.00

49.80

Byte 0xB3 (179)

48.04

49.19

5.35

0.00

100.00

51.80

Byte 0xB4 (180)

21.35

40.50

0.00

0.00

100.00

78.40

Byte 0xB5 (181)

29.44

44.35

0.00

0.00

100.00

71.00

Byte 0xB6 (182)

35.81

46.92

0.03

0.00

100.00

64.80

Byte 0xB7 (183)

58.32

48.40 100.00

0.00

100.00

41.40

Byte 0xB8 (184)

60.03

47.07

99.71

0.00

100.00

39.60

Byte 0xB9 (185)

67.95

45.13 100.00

0.00

100.00

32.00

Byte 0xBA (186)

49.14

49.76

5.55

0.00

100.00

51.00

Byte 0xBB (187)

51.73

47.42

68.99

0,00

100.00

47.60

Byte 0xBC (188)

51.89

49.40

96.39

0.00

100.00

48.40

Byte 0xBD (189)

28.78

42.32

0.44

0.00

100.00

71.20

Byte 0xBE (190)

24.92

42.91

0.00

0.00

100.00

75.40

Byte 0xBF (191)

0.41

6.32

0.00

0.00

100.00

99.60

Byte 0xC0 (192)

46.68

48.58

8.70

0.00

100.00

53.80

Byte 0xC1 (193)

15.83

36.22

0.00

0.00

100.00

84.40

Byte 0xC2 (194)

16.60

37.24

0.00

0.00

100.00

83.40

Byte 0xC3 (195)

64.11

47.24 100.00

0.00

100.00

36.40
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Byte 0xC4 (196)

46.07

49.66

0.06

0.00

100.00

54.00

Byte 0xC5 (197)

27.34

43.39

0.00

0.00

100.00

71.80

Byte 0xC6 (198)

24.44

42.98

0.00

0.00

100.00

75.60

Byte 0xC7 (199)

60.24

48.71

100.0

0.00

100.0

39.80

Byte 0xC8 (200)

60.86

47.62

100.0

0.00

100.0

39.20

Byte 0xC9 (201)

46.64

49.55

0.12

0.00

100.00

53.40

Byte 0xCA (202)

49.78

48.55

33.44

0.00

100.00

51.40

Byte 0xCB (203)

38.59

47.16

0.01

0.00

100.00

61.00

Byte 0xCC (204)

55.05

47.98

95.10

0.00

100.00

44.80

Byte 0xCD (205)

71.97

43.22 100.00

0.00

100.00

28.20

Byte 0xCE (206)

40.10

48.23

0.02

0.00

100.00

60.20

Byte 0xCF (207)

9.77

29.66

0.00

0.00

100.00

90.20

Byte 0xD0 (208)

48.37

49.45

3.74

0.00

100.00

51.80

Byte 0xD1 (209)

63.63

46.64 100.00

0.00

100.00

35.60

Byte 0xD2 (210)

38.24

48.40

0.00

0.00

100.00

61.80

Byte 0xD3 (211)

17.42

37.46

0.00

0.00

100.00

82.40

Byte 0xD4 (212)

41.62

48.61

0.16

0.00

100.00

58.40

Byte 0xD5 (213)

31.89

45.78

0.00

0.00

100.00

68.60

Byte 0xD6 (214)

44.51

47.78

3.81

0.00

100.00

55.40

Byte 0xD7 (215)

8.57

26.87

0.00

0.00

100.00

91.80

Byte 0xD8 (216)

8.73

27.61

0.00

0.00

100.00

91.20

Byte 0xD9 (217)

6.15

22.34

0.00

0.00

100.00

94.40

Byte 0xDA (218)

46.97

48.25

17.35

0.00

100.00

54.40

Byte 0xDB (219)

45.02

49.71

0.00

0.00

100.00

55.00

Byte 0xDC (220)

30.39

44.96

0.00

0.00

100.00

69.80

Byte 0xDD (221)

20.23

38.55

0.00

0.00

100.00

80.40

Byte 0xDE (222)

22.43

40.81

0.00

0.00

100.00

77.80

Byte 0xDF (223)

9.93

29.74

0.00

0.00

100.00

90.00

Byte 0xE0 (224)

50.44

49.05

56.97

0.00

100.00

49.40

Byte 0xE1 (225)

2.29

13.75

0.00

0.00

100.00

97.60
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Byte 0xE2 (226)

45.13

47.80

8.66

0.00

100.00

55.80

Byte 0xE3 (227)

37.82

48.37

0.00

0.00

100.00

62.20

Byte 0xE4 (228)

34.80

47.68

0.00

0.00

100.00

65.20

Byte 0xE5 (229)

6.52

24.03

0.00

0.00

100.00

93.60

Byte 0xE6 (230)

55.78

47.55

95.00

0.00

100.00

44.60

Byte 0xE7 (231)

48.73

49.40

12.04

0.00

100.00

51.20

Byte 0xE8 (232)

43.30

49.51

0.10

0.00

100.00

56.80

Byte 0xE9 (233)

60.98

48.37 100.00

0.00

100.00

39.40

Byte 0xEA (234)

44.22

49.17

0.22

0.00

100.00

55.80

Byte 0xEB (235)

43.35

49.46

0.00

0.00

100.00

56.80

Byte 0xEC (236)

61.83

47.12

99.99

0.00

100.00

38.60

Byte 0xED (237)

32.88

45.38

0.01

0.00

100.00

67.20

Byte 0xEE (238)

20.80

40.51

0.00

0.00

100.00

79.20

Byte 0xEF (239)

45.03

48.98

0.00

0.00

100.00

55.00

Byte 0xF0 (240)

5.32

20.59

0.00

0.00

100.00

95.00

Byte 0xF1 (241)

73.21

42.30 100.00

0.00

100.00

26.00

Byte 0xF2 (242)

41.00

48.03

0.00

0.00

100.00

59.20

Byte 0xF3 (243)

66.04

45.60 100.00

0.00

100.00

34.20

Byte 0xF4 (244)

66.00

46.68 100.00

0.00

100.00

34.40

Byte 0xF5 (245)

53.72

49.45 100.00

0.00

100.00

46.40

Byte 0xF6 (246)

64.68

46.91 100.00

0.00

100.00

35.00

Byte 0xF7 (247)

32.18

46.24

0.00

0.00

100.00

68.00

Byte 0xF8 (248)

27.29

44.45

0.00

0.00

100.00

72.80

Byte 0xF9 (249)

33.37

46.55

0.00

0.00

100.00

66.60

Byte 0xFA (250)

35.07

47.01

0.00

0.00

100.00

65.00

Byte 0xFB (251)

41.16

49.00

0.00

0.00

100.00

59.00

Byte 0xFC (252)

45.61

49.26

0.11

0.00

100.00

54.40

Byte 0xFD (253)

69.65

44.69 100.00

0.00

100.00

30.40

Byte 0xFE (254)

16.39

32.33

0.78

0.00

100.00

86.20

Byte 0xFF (255)

60.70

47.91 100.00

0.00

100.00

39.20
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The randomized payload initialization strategy used by previous attacks in the research
literature results in a low evasion rate of 46.40%. The weighted initialization strategy provides
a significant improvement, producing a 24.8% increase in evasion rate. When filling the
payload with a constant value for initialization, byte 0xBF (191) performs best, producing an
astonishing evasion rate of 99.60%. MalConv was only able to detect 2 of the 500 samples
after the adversarial payload was applied. Byte value 0x05 (5) performed worst, producing an
evasion rate of only 22.00%. While certain byte values may naturally be more indicative of
maliciousness than others, note that these byte values are only used to initialize the payload,
and do not necessarily represent byte values that will be present in the final payload after the
gradient attack and reconstruction phase have been completed.
Most perturbed malware samples result in maliciousness scores very close to 0 or 100,
indicating that most attacks are either overwhelmingly successful or complete failures. This is
the primary reason why many experiments showed median scores of either 0 or 100. When
the attack fails to lower the maliciousness scores, FGSM is likely encountering gradient
values close to 0, resulting in extremely small perturbations, if any at all.
Given the determination of best performing byte initializations was performed on a
dataset of only 500 samples, a follow-on experiment was completed using a much larger
dataset of 5,000 samples. The top 8 candidates from the previous experiment were compared
to see if the results held for this much larger dataset, again using 1,000-byte payloads. The
results are provided below in Table 2.
Table 2. A comparison of the top eight payload initialization strategies.
MalConv Maliciousness Score (Post-Reconstruction)

Initialization Strategy

Evasion

Avg

Std

Med

Min

Max

Byte 0x15 (21)

1.02

9.98

0.00

0.00

100.00

98.98

Byte 0x4F (79)

2.74

14.26

0.00

0.00

100.00

97.24

Byte 0x53 (83)

3.60

18.62

0.00

0.00

100.00

96.40

Byte 0x84 (132)

2.54

15.45

0.00

0.00

100.00

97.50

Byte 0xAA (170)

1.66

11.77

0.00

0.00

100.00

98.46

Byte 0xBF (191)

0.66

6.01

0.00

0.00

100.00

99.62

Byte 0xE1 (225)

2.01

12.51

0.00

0.00

100.00

98.08

Byte 0xF0 (240)

3.73

17.14

0.00

0.00

100.00

96.86

Rate

80
Results of the follow-on experiment reinforce that byte 0xBF (191) is the best payload
initialization strategy. With a few other bytes also scoring evasion rates above 98%, additional
experiments using even larger datasets may yield slightly different results. For the remainder
of the dissertation, byte 0xBF will be used as the default payload initialization strategy for
BitCamo.

Evading the Pre-Detection Mechanism
Before and after hashes of both the code section and full file are performed to
determine if the pre-detection mechanism could potentially succeed with the given sample.
The assumption is then made that the defender has previously observed all samples within the
test dataset, giving the pre-detection mechanism an implied initial success rate of 100%,
consistent with the results reported by Chen et al. (2019). A real-world implementation would
naturally see lower success rates as the result of previously unseen malware entering the
detection pipeline. The goal is to improve from this position by producing successful
evasions. A successful evasion can be assumed when the code section hash is different than
that of the original sample.
The subset of 1000 samples from the SOREL-20M dataset are run through the attack
tool. As discussed in the previous chapter, the attack tool no longer makes any assumption
that the code section is named .text, opting to use header values to dynamically determine
the code section for a given executable.

Table 3. Evasion rates of the pre-detection mechanism.
Technique

Evasion Count

Evasion Percentage

0

0.00%

Single byte attack to the .text section

608

60.80%

Single byte attack to a dynamically determined

636

63.60%

No evasive measures taken

code section

Results demonstrate that the technique offers an effective attack for evading the predetection mechanism. Failure cases stem from files with no available slack space at the end of
their code section. To defeat the pre-detection mechanism in those instances, it seems
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unavoidable that future research should be designed to target content within the code section
using techniques such replacement of instructions with semantically equivalent instructions of
equivalent length.

Performance Improvements to the Byte Reconstruction Phase
The attack artifact features three notable improvements over the originally proposed
attack. First, only bytes within the payload are mapped backwards through the embedding
layer, preventing wasted iterations on parts of the file that were not modified during the
gradient attack. In a worst-case scenario where 1 MB files are used, this improvement could
result in one thousand bytes being processed instead of one million bytes. Second, CPU
parallelization was implemented to take advantage of all available hardware and compute
power. Third, the L2 distance norm calculations were replaced by queries to a K-D tree to find
the closest byte to each perturbed 8-D embedding.
The table below demonstrates how each improvement affects runtime of the
reconstruction phase. Results were obtained by running experiments against the same
executable on the same hardware. A 340 KB executable was selected for use as the baseline,
as it provides a very average and representative file size. A 5,000-byte attack payload was
selected, creating a final perturbed executable size of 353,160 bytes. The experiments were
run using an Intel i7-8750H CPU, containing 6 cores at 2.20 GHz. Another executable slightly
smaller than the maximum 1 MB size was also used, such that a 5,000-byte payload could still
be appended. This data point was included as a means of estimating the theoretical maximum
runtime that can be encountered, as runtime is linearly dependent on file size with no apparent
variation possible due to other characteristics of the executable. This maximum runtime will
only vary depending on the compute power of the machine being used.
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Table 4. Performance comparison of reconstruction methods.
Payload Only

Parallel

K-D Tree

X

X

X

X

(340 KB File)

(1 MB File)
20h 19m 14s

01h 55m 58s

05h 32m 32s

06m 21s

06m 32s

X

02m 11s

05m 48s

X

01m 18s

04m 11s

01m 28s

01m 32s

X

02s

02s

X

01s

01s

X

X

Runtime

06h 47m 15s
X

X

Runtime

When utilizing the payload-only strategy, the runtime necessary to attack the smaller
executable was roughly the same as the runtime needed to attack the larger file. This result
was fully expected, as in both cases the file size is irrelevant, as the reconstruction phase
iterates over the 5,000-byte payload only.
Using K-D tree queries in combination with the payload-only strategy cut the worstcase runtime from over 20 hours to a mere 1 second. Given the tremendous amount of time
necessary to run the original reconstruction algorithm against a single sample, it was deemed
impractical and unnecessary to conduct each these experiments multiple times over a larger
sample size. Instead, only the optimal attack utilizing K-D trees over the payload was run
against a larger dataset of 5,000 samples. A follow-on experiment was therefore performed as
a means of demonstrating consistency and to ensure the 1 second reconstruction duration was
not an anomaly. Results showed a 1 second mean, 1 second median, and 2 second maximum,
confirming the previously presented results were not artifacts of the two samples selected for
the original experiment. The ability to run the reconstruction phase in a single second will
have a profound impact on practical attacks against MalConv and the ability for researchers to
test new gradient-based attack strategies over larger samples sizes.
An important but unexpected finding is the optimal result having not used the parallel
processing strategy. The best runtime occurred with the payload-only technique in
combination with a K-D tree query, completing in one second. The addition of parallel
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processing increased the duration to two seconds. In all cases the K-D tree strategy was
slower when parallelism was added. This occurs due to the time necessary to spawn and join
threads taking longer than the K-D query itself. The K-D tree already offers blazing fast
spatial searches, making the use of parallelism a hinderance to overall performance. The use
of parallelism is therefore only recommended when using the L2 distance metric. As a result
of this finding the use of parallel processing is no longer enabled by default within the attack
tool. Its use is instead made completely optional, enabled via use of a command line flag.
Alternatively, parallelism could have instead been implemented such that each sample runs in
its own thread as opposed to parallelizing the reconstruction phase only.

Validation of K-D Tree Query Accuracy
Given the massive speed improvements produced by using K-D tree queries over the
L2 distance metric, the next natural step is to ensure the speed improvements didn’t come at
the cost of reduced accuracy. Verification that both strategies produce the same or similar
results is necessary before K-D trees can gain acceptance as a full replacement for the
reconstruction phase of the attack.
Using the same hardware described in the previous section, experiments were
performed on a much larger sample size of 1,000 executables, all chosen at random from the
SOREL-20M dataset. Reconstruction was always performed using the payload-only strategy
with parallelism enabled. Smaller payloads of 1,000 bytes were used with the random payload
initialization strategy to prevent all samples from producing successful evasions and to allow
for more variance in results. Validation was performed by modifying the attack algorithm to
perform the following steps:
•

Running the attack tool normally until the gradient attack phase was completed

•

Running both reconstruction methods (K-D trees and L2 norms) against the
perturbed embeddings

•

Comparing the resulting payloads using a SHA-256 hash.

In this experiment, all 1,000 executables produced identical payloads after both
reconstruction methods were run. While this experiment does not necessarily prove that both
methods produce the same output for all possible inputs, it does provide an adequate level of
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validation necessary to show that the K-D tree data structure is safe to use as a replacement
for the reconstruction phase.

Achieving High Evasion Rates and Minimizing Payload Sizes
By utilizing all improvements presented within this dissertation, this phase of the
research attempts to achieve the highest possible evasion rates while minimizing the payload
sizes. The first experiment in this phase uses new dataset of 5,000 executables, again pulled
uniformly at random from the SOREL-20M dataset. Processing larger dataset sizes is made
possible by the performance improvements offered by K-D tree queries. The optimal byte
value 0xBF (191) was be used for the payload initialization strategy, as discovered earlier in
the chapter. FGSM was then run across the embedded payload, and the final payload was
reconstructed using K-D tree queries. Several fixed-size payload lengths were attempted to
determine the smallest possible payload necessary to attain a near-perfect evasion rate.
The results of this experiment can be found in Table 5. An evasion rate of 99% is
attained using 900-byte payloads. The experiment increases the payload size in 100-byte
increments, running the attack tool against the full dataset for each payload size. The attack
continues to yield better evasion results until 900 bytes is reached, at which point the attack is
unable to improve any further.

Table 5. Evaluation of attack success using 0xBF (191) byte initialization.
MalConv Maliciousness Score (Post-Reconstruction)

Payload Length

Evasion

Avg

Std

Med

Min

Max

100 bytes

75.89

40.46

100.00

0.00

100.00

23.88

200 bytes

53.24

46.91

74.70

0.00

100.00

47.14

300 bytes

34.69

45.01

0.92

0.00

100.00

66.04

400 bytes

19.56

36.51

0.02

0.00

100.00

81.02

500 bytes

8.52

25.82

0.00

0.00

100.00

91.84

600 bytes

4.33

18.91

0.00

0.00

100.00

95.92

700 bytes

2.47

14.70

0.00

0.00

100.00

97.64

800 bytes

1.47

11.64

0.00

0.00

100.00

98.56

Rate
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900 bytes

1.03

9.98

0.00

0.00

100.00

99.00

1,000 bytes

1.02

9.98

0.00

0.00

100.00

98.98

1,100 bytes

1.19

10.70

0.00

0.00

100.00

98.82

1,200 bytes

1.13

10.48

0.00

0.00

100.00

98.88

1,300 bytes

1.13

10.43

0.00

0.00

100.00

98.88

1,400 bytes

1.02

9.96

0.00

0.00

100.00

99.00

1,500 bytes

1.02

9.98

0.00

0.00

100.00

98.98

10,000 bytes

1.02

9.98

0.00

0.00

100.00

98.98

Payload size equation

3.38

17.44

0.00

0.00

100.00

96.70

It can be observed that nearly half of the samples are able to achieve evasion using
payload sizes of only 200 bytes. Applying a fixed-length payload to the entire dataset is
therefore not an optimal approach. Kreuk et al. (2018) provide an equation for automatically
selecting a payload size. Its use reduces the average payload size to 871 bytes on average, but
also reduces the evasion rate by a few percentage points, making the fixed 900-byte payloads
a better overall choice. Given the massive speed improvements made possible through the use
of K-D trees in the reconstruction phase, it becomes apparent that the attack can be attempted
using several candidate payload sizes for each sample. This would greatly reduce the average
payload size for successful attacks.
A binary search is an obvious choice for finding the optimal payload size in
logarithmic time. In practice, however, this failed to work properly. During implementation it
was discovered that some payload sizes can fail with large payloads but later succeed with
smaller payloads. This presents problems for the binary search, as increase the payload size
upon failure could be a move in the wrong direction for a certain subset of samples. Instead,
the search for an optimal payload size was implemented as an iterative approach starting at
50-byte payloads and increasing in 50-byte increments up to a 2000-byte maximum payload
size. These amounts can be adjusted depending on tolerance for longer runtimes.
The new payload size optimization algorithm was included in the attack tool and ran
against the same 5,000 sample dataset as before. Results showed a 100% evasion rate with an
average payload size of exactly 300 bytes. The reduction in payload size was expected, but
the increase in evasion rate was not. Attempting several payload sizes allowed the remaining
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stubborn samples to achieve evasion. As described earlier, some samples were able to benefit
from a reduction in payload size rather than an increase. The new attack was then performed
on a second dataset of 5,000 samples, again pulled uniformly at random from the larger
SOREL-20M dataset. Results again showed a 100% evasion rate with just shy of 300-byte
payload sizes on average. It’s possible that adding a binary search only after successful
completion of this iterative process could allow for another very minor reduction in average
payload size, effectively searching the 50-byte window between the last failed attempt and the
most recent successful attempt. This will likely result in the average payload size dropping
below 300 bytes.

Comparison to Existing Attacks
Two other open-source libraries for creating adversarial attacks against MalConv are
SecML Malware by Demetrio et al. (2021b) and MalwareRL by Anderson et al. (2018).
SecML Malware includes several white-box attacks that share similarities to the attacks
presented in this dissertation. By contrast, MalwareRL is a black-box attack tool utilizing
reinforcement learning. This section will focus exclusively on comparisons to other white-box
attacks.
The work presented in this dissertation is largely an adaptation and improvement of
the append-based FGSM attack originally proposed by Kreuk et al. (2018), which was later
implemented by Demetrio et al. (2021b) as part of the SecML Malware library. Comparison
tests against attacks provided in the SecML Malware library are therefore provided as a
means of confirming that the evasion rates and runtimes produced by BitCamo are an
improvement over existing attacks against MalConv.
For these experiments, 200 samples were selected uniformly at random from the
SOREL-20M dataset, with file sizes still capped at 1 MB. The dataset size was significantly
reduced from previous experiments to allow for direct comparison of success levels to slower
attacks. While performing these experiments, it became clear that some samples were
achieving evasion only because MalConv was classifying them incorrectly to begin with, as
MalConv assigned them a benign label before ever being attacked. After dropping these
samples from inclusion in the results, it became clear that certain attacks were completely
unsuccessful, unable to influence the predictions of MalConv. The results provided in Table 6
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therefore do not include samples that MalConv classified as benign prior to the attack code
running. Each attack was attempted using 1,000-, 5,000-, and 10,000-byte payloads. All
attacks were run using SecML Malware version 0.2.4 with default parameters used unless
otherwise specified. Tuning additional parameters may have resulted in changes to the
runtimes and evasion rates if attempted.
Given that each tool can output a perturbed executable, results were cross validated
using the opposing tool. For example, the executables output from BitCamo were supplied to
SecML Malware for the purposes of recording the initial prediction only, ensuring both tools
were in agreeance that a particular executable had successfully achieved evasion against
MalConv.

Table 6. Comparison of BitCamo v1.1.0 to SecML Malware v0.2.4.
Attack
SecML CKreukEvasion

Total Runtime (Avg.)

Evasion Rate

23s

0.00

33s

0.00

01m 02s

0.00

14s

0.00

26s

0.00

48s

0.00

01m 32s

16.67

01m 10s

16.67

01m 10s

16.67

1,000 bytes
SecML CKreukEvasion
5,000 bytes
SecML CKreukEvasion
10,000 bytes
SecML CSuciuEvasion
1,000 bytes
SecML CSuciuEvasion
5,000 bytes
SecML CSuciuEvasion
10,000 bytes
SecML CPaddingEvasion
1,000 bytes
SecML CPaddingEvasion
5,000 bytes
SecML CPaddingEvasion
10,000 bytes
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SecML CHeaderFieldsEvasion

14s

29.63

15s

29.63

SecML CContentShiftingEvasion

21s

35.19

SecML CHeaderEvasion

17s

35.19

13s

42.59

SecML CFormatExploitEvasion

03s

96.29

SecML CExtendDOSEvasion

02s

96.29

BitCamo

01s

99.38

01s

99.38

03s

99.38

05s

100.00

optimize_all_dos=False
SecML CHeaderFieldsEvasion
optimize_all_dos=True

optimize_all_dos=False
SecML CHeaderEvasion
optimize_all_dos=True

1,000 bytes
BitCamo
5,000 bytes
BitCamo
10,000 bytes
BitCamo
Minimal Payload Size Search

The Kreuk attack included in the SecML Malware library is closest in similarity to the
attack strategy used in BitCamo, as both techniques perform a gradient-based attack against a
payload appended to the end of the file. Results show that the SecML Malware
implementation of the Kreuk attack does not work at all. It’s unclear if this is due to an
implementation issue, software bug, or limitations in the attack itself.
SecML Malware also includes several attacks that are fundamentally different, opting
to attack headers near the beginning of Windows PE files. Many of the novel contributions
prosed by the authors of SecML Malware were focused on header field manipulations
(Demetrio et al., 2021b). These attacks proved to be incredibly effective, providing an evasion
rate of 96.38%. Although BitCamo was able to achieve a 100% evasion rate, it’s likely that
SecML Malware would outperform BitCamo if the dataset included samples greater than 1
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MB, which BitCamo is unable to attack in its current form. BitCamo can likely be extended to
attack other areas of the Windows PE file with very little effort, which would give it the
ability to successfully attack larger file sizes. The direct manipulation of headers by SecML
Malware may be easier for analysts with domain expertise to identify, especially if the MSDOS stub is overwritten. This may be an important consideration if attacks are extended to
include larger detection pipelines or actual antivirus products. Future research and
enhancements to BitCamo will be discussed in Chapter 5.
Results demonstrate that BitCamo is a competitive tool capable of achieving
extremely high evasion rates and at significantly faster speeds that other attacks. SecML
Malware is a comparatively more robust framework offering a wider variety of attacks for
users to select from, with some capable of achieving similar results as BitCamo. SecML
Malware is currently the best tool for attacking files greater than 1MB in size. Both tools
would likely benefit from the addition of techniques used by the other tool.
In addition to direct comparison tests against SecML Malware, BitCamo is also
compared to the reported results from other papers within the research literature. Other papers
featuring gradient-based white-box attacks against Malconv reported rather inconsistent
results overall. These papers include:
•

Kolosnjaji et al. (2018) achieve an evasion rate of 60% when using 10,000-byte
payloads in the file overlay.

•

Kreuk et al. (2018) report a 99% evasion rate with payload sizes between 500 and
1,000 bytes when using iterative FGSM on a payload in the file overlay. While the
results are impressive, the dataset used to train MalConv and evaluate the attack
may be unsuited for the task at hand. The Microsoft Kaggle 2015 dataset was used,
containing samples from only 9 different malware families and with their PE
headers completely removed (Ronen, Radu, Feuerstein, Yom-Tov, & Ahmadi,
2018). Kreuk et al. (2018) use approximately 7,000 samples from this dataset, readding headers using different malicious executables downloaded from
VirusShare. Both Suciu et al. (2019) and Raff et al. (2018a) allude to extreme
overfitting issues when training MalConv on datasets of this size, suggesting
instead that datasets with hundreds of thousands of samples be used, if not
millions, to best represent executables that may be encountered a real-world
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situation. The SecML Malware implementation of this same attack performs
extremely poorly when used on the much more robust EMBER-trained MalConv
model, as demonstrated earlier in this section.
•

The one-shot FGSM attack by Suciu et al. (2019) attains a 1% evasion rate on a
small dataset, 33% evasion rate against the EMBER-trained MalConv model, and
a 71% evasion rate against a model trained on a much larger dataset, all while
using a 10,000-byte payload.

•

Chen et al. (2019) reported extremely low success rates of 1-2% when using
FGSM on payload sizes of up to 20,000 bytes. Their newly proposed EnhancedBFA attack algorithm is reported to achieve 99% evasion using 20,000 bytes, but
only 74% using 500 bytes. Chen et al. (2019) also use a smaller dataset with only
5,200 malicious samples to train their model and evaluate the attacks, and may
suffer from the same overfitting issues as Kreuk et al. (2018).

BitCamo appears to significantly outperform each of the above attacks in terms of
both evasion rate and minimizing the required payload size, achieving a 100% evasion rate for
files less than 1 MB, using payload sizes of only 300 bytes on average. Attack duration and
performance were typically not provided by the authors of other papers.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
This chapter highlights notable contributions presented within this dissertation, to
include discussion about the applicability of these contributions to attacks against other
models. Known limitations of the new contributions are provided, as well as future research
directions and recommendations for improvement of the attack tool.

Contributions
An open-source attack tool was developed with the goal of aiding researchers in
producing adversarial attacks against malware classifiers. The intention is that the availability
of such tooling will raise awareness about adversarial attacks and demonstrate the ease at
which these attacks can be conducted. The ability to detect malware using featureless machine
learning models is a powerful capability, but care should be taken to protect these models
from this new form of attack. The new attack tool created for this dissertation was named
BitCamo and can be found at https://www.github.com/juburr/bitcamo.
The payload reconstruction phase results in a natural loss in precision, making it
possible for the embedded representation of bytes to successfully evade MalConv, but then
fail again after reconstruction is completed. A modified algorithm was introduced that runs
FGSM with a higher epsilon value and then continues running it until the prediction reported
by MalConv is less than 1%. A much stronger perturbation is generated by continuing the
attack instead of stopping after a score of less than 50% is obtained, as proposed in the initial
algorithm by Kreuk et al. (2018). Stronger perturbations of the embedded bytes made it more
likely that the payload would continue to evade MalConv after the reconstruction phase was
completed, resulting in higher evasion rates than previous works.
New payload initialization strategies were presented. The most promising strategies
involved filling the payload with the same byte value in all positions. This dissertation finds
that the byte value 0xBF (191) allows for the highest evasion rate, followed closely by bytes
0x15 (21), 0xE1 (225), and 0xAA (170). Previous researchers use random payload
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initializations, which resulted in an evasion rate of only 46.40% using 1,000-byte payloads
with the new attack tool. The new payload initialization strategy significantly increased the
evasion rate to 99% using fixed payload sizes of 900 bytes when applied to executables less
than 1MB in size. An algorithm for optimizing the payload size was then introduced, also
helping to evade the remaining 1% of samples. With both improvements present, the new
attack tool achieves a 100% evasion rate using payload sizes of only 300 bytes on average.
A faster method for conducting the reconstruction phase of the attack was presented.
K-D trees appear to offer an overwhelming improvement over repeatedly calculating the L2
norm. The K-D tree queries allow the reconstruction phase to finish in under one second,
allowing for a more practical bulk processing capability, ultimately enabling experimentation
that led to discovery of the other improvements. This demonstrates the importance of the
engineering cycle within design science research.
Finally, a single-byte attack against the code section of executables was presented as a
means of defeating a recently proposed pre-detection mechanism. The attack succeeds in
63.60% of cases. The attack can be chained together with the improved adversarial attack
strategy to defeat a detection pipeline containing both the pre-detection mechanism and
MalConv.

Research Questions
The original research questions will now be re-visited, answered, and compared the
original hypotheses offered in chapter three.

Research Question 1
Can the append-based FGSM attack be re-implemented and improved to achieve consistently
high evasion rates?

Answer
The FGSM overlay attack was successfully re-implemented and improved to achieve 100%
evasion rates using an average payload size of only 300 bytes when applied to Windows PE
files less than 1 MB in size. This result exceeded expectations, with the original hypothesis
predicting a 99% evasion rate when using payloads up to several thousand bytes in length.
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Research Question 2
Can the append-based FGSM attack benefit from a new byte initialization strategy?

Answer
The improved payload initialization strategy was the most important contribution used to
achieve the perfect evasion rate. The weighted initialization scheme was predicted to provide
the best results but instead offered only a modest improvement. Initializing every byte with
the same value was predicted to offer poor results, but the results varied greatly depending on
which byte value was used. Certain byte values provided extremely poor results, whereas
others allowed for the perfect evasion rates when used with the new payload size
minimization algorithm.

Research Question 3
Can the recently proposed pre-detection mechanism be completely bypassed?

Answer
The lack of slack space in the code section of certain executables was problematic for the
proposed attack. The original hypothesis predicted nearly every sample could achieve
evasion, but only 63% of samples were able to successfully defeat the pre-detection
mechanism.

Research Question 4
Can performance of the long-running reconstruction phase of the append-based FGSM attack
be improved?

Answer
Results were much better than anticipated. K-D tree queries offered massive speed
improvements, allowing the reconstruction phase to complete in under a second on a personal
laptop.
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Applicability of Contributions to Other Models
As one of the first successful implementations of a raw byte classifier, MalConv is an
obvious target for researchers studying adversarial attacks. It’s important to note that many
components from the MalConv architecture are likely to be present within other raw byte
models as well, especially as a means of contending with memory limitations on GPUs. For
example, the use of 1D convolutional layers is important for reducing the large dimensionality
of raw byte inputs and dealing with spatial invariance, given that a malicious feature may not
necessarily occur at the exact same position within every file. Likewise, max pooling layers
are likely to be used over average pooling because a malicious feature may only appear once
within a given file, and an average pooling layer may inadvertently drown out a single strong
activation.
Recall from the literature review that another successful raw byte model, AvastConv,
was proposed by Krcál et al. (2018). Although this model was developed independently of
MalConv, it still ended up sharing many of the same architectural components, such as the
inclusion of a non-differentiable 8D embedding layer, 1D convolutional layers, a max pooling
layer, and fully connected layers (Krcál et al., 2018). This was not by mistake, as these
components each provide extremely desirable outcomes, making it likely that future raw byte
classifiers will share similar designs.
To that end, the K-D tree improvement can be used on any model containing a nondifferentiable embedding layer and is not limited to the malware domain. Depending on the
application, however, care should be taken to avoid the “curse of dimensionality” discussed
earlier in this dissertation. For raw byte classifiers with only 256 possible byte values to map
back to, this should not be an issue. Likewise, any attack attempting to map backwards
through such an embedding layer would be wise to follow the guidance provided earlier in
this dissertation, by producing extremely strong perturbations within embedding space to
allow for some natural loss in precision to occur after the reconstruction phase of the attack is
completed.
The use of the 0xBF byte initialization strategy is unlikely to work for malware
classifiers trained on a different architecture or with a vastly different dataset. The strategy
used to find this magic byte, however, is very likely to work with other architectures as well.
It can be formalized as an algorithm that progressively eliminates underperforming bytes from
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contention as viable candidates. This would save compute cycles by preventing samples later
in the dataset from being attacked using candidate bytes that have low success rates thus far,
identifying the top performers much quicker than the method used in chapter 4 of this
dissertation.
The iterative search for an optimal payload size can be applied to any other payloadbased attack against malware classifiers. The use of payloads is more likely to occur with
attacks targeting raw byte classifiers than those targeting feature-based classifiers though. The
search for an optimal payload size naturally incurs additional runtime as well, meaning it may
not be best suited for use with attacks that already have significantly high runtimes.
The single-byte attack against the pre-detection mechanism is a tailored attack
unlikely to be reused for anything other than changing the hash of the code section. The idea
of targeting multiple defensive resources within a single detection pipeline is worthy of
additional study and inclusion within other attack tools.

Applicability of Modern Adversarial Attacks to MalConv
This dissertation makes use of FGSM for performing the gradient-based portion of the
attack against MalConv. FGSM is one of the oldest and simplest gradient attacks in existence.
More accurately, an iterative version of FGSM alternatively known as the BIM is used. This
begs the question of whether a more powerful and modern attack could have been used
instead.
FGSM was manually replaced with other attack algorithms provided by the
CleverHans library. At the very least, this successfully demonstrates the ability to use newer
attacks against MalConv. Recall that BitCamo is already able to achieve a 100% evasion rate
using FGSM when targeting executables susceptible to an overlay-based attack. Swapping in
newer attacks appeared to offer no improvement to overall success rates or a reduction in
payload sizes, and only contributed towards significantly increasing the runtime of the attack.
By contract, FGSM is extremely fast, with each iteration completing nearly instantly. Given
the already perfect evasion rate, it appears undesirable to replace FGSM with a different
attack algorithm unless the algorithm can either further reduce the payload size or contend
with the non-differentiable embedding layer in a different manner. As it stands, other
algorithms simply increase the runtime with no clear benefit. This bears similarities to model
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selection for machine learning, where the latest and greatest deep neural network may not
necessarily be the best tool for a given job.
BitCamo can likely be adapted into a more generic framework, architected to include
two distinct software components. One component would handle specifics of the Windows PE
file format, carving out space to use for payloads, forwarding bytes through the initial
embedding layer, and conducting the final reconstruction phase. The second component of the
software would be responsible for performing the actual gradient-based attack given a range
of bytes that can safely be perturbed, with the attack algorithm being completely configurable.
This would allow FGSM to be swapped out for other attack algorithms, hiding intricacies of
the Windows PE file format for researchers more interested in the machine learning portion of
the attack. Another advantage to handling file format issues separately is that the first
software component could itself become a pluggable interface, replaceable with code to
handle other executable file formats such as ELF, or even file formats belonging to
completely different domains outside of the malware arena. These formats could then be
attacked without having to modify the gradient-based portion of the attack framework.
Domain experts would be able to make additions to this part of the framework without the
need to know anything about machine learning. It should be noted that refactoring BitCamo
into a generic framework has yet to be performed. Applying attack algorithms other than
FGSM is worth some additional investigation in future research, however, especially after a
more pluggable framework is developed.

Limitations and Future Research
The append-based attack to the overlay section will fail when file sizes exceed the
maximum input size for MalConv. In the case of the EMBER-trained MalConv model, the
limit is 1 MB. For adversarial attacks to succeed against larger files, perturbations must be
targeted towards early parts of the file to ensure adversarial payloads will be retained after the
file is truncated. While most malware samples are relatively small, the next logical step is to
add additional capabilities to the attack tool, including the slack space attack by Suciu et al
(2019), header-based attacks by Demetrio et al. (2021b), and code section modifications by
Sharif, Lucas, Bauer, Reiter, & Shintre (2019). Each of these attacks can place adversarial
bytes at much earlier locations within Windows PE files and thereby allow attacks to succeed
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when using file sizes larger than 1 MB. Attacks within slack space could also be more
successful than those utilizing the file overlay, as first demonstrated by Suciu et al. (2019).
This may be due to headers from the following section being included in the same 500-byte
convolutional window as the adversarial payload.
BitCamo does not have the ability to defeat signed executables, such as those using
Microsoft Authenticode. This limitation was not a big impediment to the project, however, as
the vast majority of malware is not signed.
The pre-detection mechanism is just one example of a tool or service that may be used
to augment the MalConv detection model. The attack on the pre-detection mechanism was
primarily included in this dissertation as a means of demonstrating that attacks can be chained
together to defeat multiple detection capabilities with a single perturbed executable. Future
research should consider even larger detection pipelines. Recent job postings reveal
companies have an increased interest in applying red teaming resources towards AI models,
MLOps pipelines, and even their supporting infrastructure. Likewise, academic research
should also consider attacks that extend beyond the model itself.
Naturally, an end goal for an attack tool such as BitCamo is to demonstrate the ability
to bypass real-world anti-virus products. Given that these products typically employ hybridbased approaches driven by multiple detection capabilities, a single attack should therefore be
capable of evading a diverse range of defenses. To that end, a natural next step for this project
is to attack additional detection models instead of limiting the scope to MalConv. This should
include additional raw byte classifiers such as non-negative MalConv, MalConv2, or
AvastConv. More importantly, the tool must be capable of defeating feature-based detection
models for which payload-based approaches will likely be less effective. A LightGBM model
using EMBER features appears to be a popular approach for feature-based detection.
Replacing TensorFlow with PyTorch may be beneficial in accomplishing some of these
objectives, as the academic community now appears to heavily favor the use of PyTorch.
Other potential research directions may include:
•

The ability to create adversarial examples using additional executable file formats,
such as ELF and Mach-O, or even file formats frequently used to deliver malware,
such as Microsoft Office documents. When attacking file formats without existing
research literature pertaining to adversarial examples, a review of steganography,
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data hiding, or covert channels for the associated file format would be highly
beneficial, as similar methods will likely be used for placement of adversarial
bytes within the file.
•

Exploring optimal conditions that allow adversarial payloads to transfer to other
executables, or research into the development of payloads that act as universal
adversarial perturbations.

•

Fine-grained code section modifications building off the work of Sharif et al.
(2019) was an effective alternative to the much larger code caves being utilized at
more obvious locations throughout the executable. This would naturally result in
complete evasion of the pre-detection mechanism as well.

•

Adversarial attacks against models used to classify the specific family of malware,
such as models trained using the MOTIF dataset (Joyce, Amlani, Nicholas, &
Raff, 2021). Misclassification of the malware family could have implications that
include deliberate misattribution of malware to another threat actor.
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